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COMPARATIVE FAULT AND INTENTIONAL TORTS:




The whole outline of the law is the resultant of a conflict at
every point between logic and good sense-the one striving to-
work fiction out to consistent results, and the other restraining
and at last overcoming the effort when the results become too
manifestly unjust.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to consider fully the conduct of all parties to a tort
action and to allocate liability accordingly, courts recently have ex-
tended the application of comparative fault principles. Faced with
defendants liable under negligence, recklessness, or strict liability,
courts have determined respective liabilities of defendants and plain-
tiffs, and have reduced plaintiffs' damages in proportion to their
liability.
No court, however, has explicitly applied comparative fault
principles to intentional torts. This "rule" is supported by social pol-
icy considerations against sanctioning, or even appearing to facilitate,
self-help-i.e., the taking of the law into one's own hands'-by de-
fendant tortfeasors. But what is the rule when the defendant's inten-
tional act is not characterized by self-help? Consider the following
hypothetical: 8 plaintiff constructed a drainage outlet running from
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1. Holmes, Agency, 4 HAV. L. REv. 345, 346 (1891).
2. See infra text following note 88.
3. Based on Sandifer Motors, Inc. v. City of Roeland Park, 6 Kan. App. 2d 308, 628
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his warehouse into a ravine. He negligently installed an outlet with
a diameter too small to function properly. Defendant maintained a
garbage dump above plaintiffs ravine. Over a course of months, deb-
ris from defendant's dump fell down the ravine, blocked plaintiff's
outlet, and flooded his warehouse. If plaintiff's drain had been prop-
erly constructed, the backup would have been less severe. Plaintiff
complained to defendant, and defendant was aware that his debris
was periodically falling and blocking plaintiff's drain. One year after
defendant first learned of the problem, a large amount of debris
again fell and blocked plaintiff's drain, causing damage to plaintiff's
property, for which plaintiff now sues.
Most courts faced with this situation would award plaintiff full
recovery. Because plaintiff was the victim of an intentional
tort-nuisance-and even though he was negligent, the court will
likely announce that comparative fault has no application since, it is
said, negligence and intentional conduct cannot be compared because
they are "different in kind."
This article challenges this traditional result and its rationale.
We contend that negligence, recklessness, and intentional con-
duct-the three traditional classifications of fault-are not different
in kind, but merely reflect degrees of violation of a common social
norm. We further assert that in some intentional tort situations, as in
the intentional nuisance discussed above, policy considerations bal-
ance in favor of open and express application of comparative fault
principles.
Part II discusses the evolution of the current rule against appor-
tioning fault in intentional torts. Part III analyzes theoretical and
policy barriers to application of comparative fault in intentional
torts. This part dismisses the theory of "different in kind," arguing
instead that traditional categorizations of fault reflect a continuum of
conduct in violation of a singular social norm. After addressing social
policy considerations, this part concludes that comparative fault
should not be extended to self-help intentional torts, such as battery,
but that policy considerations may militate in favor of applying the
doctrine to some non-self-help intentional torts, such as intentional
nuisance. Part IV discusses the trend toward comparative fault in
recklessness and strict liability actions, the recent application by
some courts of comparative fault principles to self-help intentional
torts, and recent attempts by courts faced with nuisance actions to
apply comparative principles. Finally, Part V analyzes the role of
P.2d 239 (1981), discussed infra at notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
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comparative fault statutes as applied to appropriate non-self-help in-
tentional tort cases.
II. HISTORY OF THE RULE AGAINST APPLICATION OF
COMPARATIVE FAULT IN CASES OF INTENTIONAL CONDUCT
A. Early Admiralty Law: Division of Loss and Intentional
Conduct
The modern rule of apportioning damages in negligence actions
has its genesis in the ancient shipping codes of Europe and Britain.'
The most notable of these are the famous Rolls of Oleron,5 which
were eventually incorporated in The Black Book of The Admiralty
and administered in the admiralty courts as early as 1338.1 In the
sixteenth century, when the High Court of Admiralty was faced for
the first time with the issue of damages due to ship collision, it relied
4. The first code that mandated apportionment of damages according to fault was theConsulato del Mare, written in the mid-fourteenth century. Turk, Comparative Negligence on
the March, 28 CHI-KENT L. REV. 189, 222-23 (1950).
5. Rolls of Oleron, (twelfth century), reprinted in 1 THE BLACK BOOK OF THE ADMI-
RALTY 88-131 (Twiss ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as BLACK BOOK OF ADMIRALTY]; see also30 F. Cas. 1171 (1897). Although the origin of the Rolls is uncertain, some authorities claimthat Richard the First brought them to Britain. E. ROSCOE, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW,
112-13 (1911); J. SELDoN, AN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF THE LAWS AND
GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND, pt. 2, ch. V, 25 (5th ed. London 1760) (1st ed. London 1688); J.
SELDON, MARE CLAUSUM, TRANSLATED, OF THE DOMINION OR OWNERSHIP OF THE SEA,bk. II ch. XXIV, 386-87 (1st ed. London 1652 & photo reprint 1972); Sprague, DividedDamages, 6 N.Y.U.L. REv. 15, 15-21 (1928). Contra F. SANBORN, ORIGINS OF THE EARLY
ENGLISH MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW, 64 (1930); 1 BLACK BOOK OF ADMIRALTY,
xiii n.1 passim, Introduction.
6. BLAcK BOOK OF ADMIRALTY, supra note 5. The book was compiled in the four-
teenth century, though its documents are considered of much earlier origin. R. MARSDEN,
DOCUMENTS RELATING To LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA, 118 (1915-16). See discussion ofthe history of the Rolls of Oleron in 4 BLACK BOOK OF ADMIRALTY, vii-lxii. See generallySprague, supra note 5; Turk, supra note 4; see also A. WHITE, OUTLINES OF LEGAL HIS-
TORY 27 (1895); 4 BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS, THE LAW OF COLLISIONS AT SEA (K. McGuf-fie ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS]; Huger, Proportional Damage
Rule in Collisions at Sea, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 531 (1927).
7. W. PRYNNE, BRIEF ANIMADVERSIONS ON AMENDMENTS OF AND ADDITIONAL Ex-
PLANATORY RECORDS TO THE FoURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND, 110, 117 (London 1669); BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS, supra note 6, at 109-10 n.10. F.
SANBORN, supra note 5 at 70, 265, claims that the codes were used as authority even earlier.
The Rolls were relied on as authority in Pilk v. Venore (1346), a case widely reported in theliterature. I BLACK BooK OF ADMIRALTY, supra note 5, at lxi-lxii; 2 R. MARSDEN, SELECT
PLEAS IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY, xliii (1897) [hereinafter cited as SELECT PLEAS]; W.
PRYNNE, supra at 117; F. SANBORN, supra note 5, at 270. See generally R. MARSDEN, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COLLISIONS AT SEA (8th ed. 1923) [hereinafter cited as COLLI-
SIONS AT SEA]. The Rolls were cited as authority in an inquisition in 1375. E. ROSCOE, supra
note 5, at 113.
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on the Rolls and held that loss should be divided equally between the
parties.a The rule of "division of loss" was later applied in numerous
cases throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
9
During this same period, however, the admiralty courts some-
times strayed from the equal division rule, applying it inconsis-
tently1" and venturing in some cases to apportion damages according
to each party's share of the fault.1 Still, although different damages
schemes were applied over the years, one rule was rigidly adhered
to: neither apportionment nor equal division applied when a party
acted intentionally. 2 According to article XIV of the Rolls of
8. Handcocke v. Payne (1539), reprinted in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 7 at 90; see
also id. lxxii. The division of loss rule is found in the Rolls of Oleron, supra note 5, art. XIV:
If a vessel, being moored, lying at anchor, be struck or grappled with another
vessel under sail, that is not very well steered, whereby the vessel at anchor is
prejudiced, as also wines, or other merchandize in each of the said ships damni-
fled. In this case the whole damage shall be in common, and be equally divided
and appraised half by half- and the master and the mariners of the vessel that
struck or grappled with the other, shall be bound to swear on the Holy Evange-
lists, that they did it not willingly or wilfully. The reason why this judgment was
first given, being, that an old decayed vessel might not purposely be put in the
way of a better, which will the rather be prevented when they know that the
damage must be divided.
30 F. Cas. 1171, 1178 (1897) (emphasis added).
9. E.g., Kichener v. Cocklin, Burrell, 23 Brit. Mar. Cas. 294 (1706); Nodem v. Ashton,
Burrell, 23 Brit. Mar. Cas. 290 (1706); Beckham v. Chapman, Burrell, 23 Brit. Mar. Cas.
270 (1695); Trew v. Peirce, Burrell, 23 Brit. Mar. Cas. 264 (1692); Harper v. Gravenor,
Burrell, 23 Brit. Mar. Cas. 251 (1677); Harbyn v. Berry, Burrell, 23 Brit. Mar. Cas. 235
(1648). The rule was applied even when one party was "more at fault than the other,"
Wildman v. Blakes, Burrell, 23 Brit. Mar. Cas. 332 (1789); contra Ann of Mostein, Burrell,
23 Brit. Mar. Cas. 263, 264 (1691) (applying a form of contributory negligence) (see infra
note 20). Curiously, division was sometimes applied when the defendant alone was at fault.
Nelson v. Fawcett, Burrell, 23 Brit. Mar. Cas. 332 (1789); Conwallis v. Noden, File 117
n.145, in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 7, at lxxxv.
10. The admiralty courts at times allowed and at other times disallowed division of
damages when there was mutual fault. Generally, when only one party was at fault, the entire
loss fell on him. Fletham v. Godfrey, Burrell, 23 Brit. Mar. Cas. 298 (1709). When neither
party was at fault, the court imposed no damages. Baker v. Malin, Burrell, 23 Brit. Mar. Cas.
322 (1764). But in another case the court allowed division though only the defendant was at
fault. Nelson v. Fawcett, Burrell, 23 Brit. Mar. Cas. 332 (1789). See generally cases cited in 2
SELECT PLEAS, supra note 7, at lxxxiv nn.7 & 8.
11. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1953). In King v.
Johnson (1643), discussed in 2 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 7, at lxxxiii-iv n.17, the plaintiff
proved £1,800 in full damages but was awarded only £400. Partial damages were awarded in
another case in 1687. Id. Still, equal division remained the general rule until 1911 when
Britain conformed to the rule of apportionment under the Brussels Maritime Convention. 4
BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS, supra note 6, § 147, at 114 n.38 and citations; Mole & Wilson, A
Study of Comparative Negligence, (pts. I & 2) 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 604, at 342-45 (1932);
Prosser, supra, at 10 nn.48 & 49.
12. Harper v. Gravenor, Burrell, 23 Brit. Mar. Cas. 251 (1677); 4 BRITISH SHIPPING
LAWS, supra note 6, § 141, at 111; 2 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 7, at lxxxv n.5.
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Oleron, this was necessary to assure that "an old decayed vessel
might not purposely be put in the way of a better, which will rather
be prevented when they know that the damage must be divided.""8 A
commentary to the Rolls expanded on the reason behind the rule:
"for an old vessel that's worth a little or nothing, might else be put
in a new one's way: and if she runs against her, more damages be
pretended, than the old ship might fairly be valued at."1' The same
pragmatic rationale was echoed in another authoritative maritime
code, the Laws of Wisby:18 "if it was done by the master on purpose
. ..he alone shall make satisfaction. The reason is, that some mas-
ters who have old crazy ships, may willingly lay in another ship's
way, that they may be damnified or sunk, and so have more than
they were worth for them.""'
These ancient codes show that at the earliest times, distinctions
were drawn between "accidental" (negligent) collisions, and inten-
tional ones: division of loss applied to the former, but not to the lat-
ter. And, although the rule survives today, its rationale has changed.
The maritime codes declined to divide or apportion damages in cases
of intentional collision, in order to prevent cheating. As discussed
below, common law courts, on the other hand, have articulated vari-
ous explanations for declining to apportion damages in cases in
which one party has acted intentionally, and another negligently.
Early common law courts seemed more concerned with result than
with theory; they distinguished between intentional and negligent
conduct in order to circumvent the harsh effect of the contributory
negligence bar, and thereby to punish and deter intentional
tortfeasors.17 Modern courts at the turn of the century reached the
same result by theorizing that intentional and negligent conduct is
"different in kind" and therefore not susceptible to comparison."8
13. Rolls of Oleron, art. XIV, quoted supra note 8.
14. "Observation" of Rolls of Oleron, art. XIV, supra note 8, in 30 F. Cas. 1171, 1178
(1897).
15. Laws of Wisby, (thirteenth century), reprinted in 4 BLACK BOOK OF ADMIRALTY,
supra note 5, at 261-84 (also in 30 F. Cas. 1189-95 (1897)). See discussion of the relationship
between the Laws of Wisby, the Rolls of Oleron, and other ancient shipping codes in Coi-
SIONS AT SEA, supra note 7, at 153-55.
16. Laws of Wisby, art. XXVI, reprinted in 30 F. Gas. 1189, 1191 (1897). Following
the intentional conduct rule set out above, the court in Milton v. Maundrell, Burrell, 23 Brit.
Mar. Gas. 305, 305-06 (1719), condemned the defendant to pay full damages for his ship
having run down the other "willfully."
17. See infra notes 19-39 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
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B. Early Common Law: The Contributory Negligence Doctrine and
Intentional Torts
Early common law courts dealt harshly with plaintiffs who
were at fault.' The seminal British case of Butterfield v. Forrester
denied recovery when the plaintiff's negligence contributed to his in-
juries, on the theory that "one person being at fault will not dispense
with another's using ordinary care for himself."' Contributory neg-
ligence as an absolute defense was well-received in England"1 and
the United States," and is today still applied in eight states. 8
The courts soon recognized, however, that barring recovery to a
plaintiff who contributed to his own injury often produced inequita-
ble and harsh results. Thus, limitations were imposed on the use of
the contributory negligence doctrine as an absolute defense.' 4 Two
19. Although division of loss seems indigenous to the admiralty courts, some common
law courts did consider apportioning damages based on fault. Early attempts by Illinois and
Kansas to mitigate contributory negligence relied on fictional classifications of "gross" and
"slight" negligence. These schemes proved unworkable. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 434 nn.56-59 (4th ed. 1971).
20. Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 61, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (1809). This case is
said to be the genesis of the contributory negligence doctrine. Turk, supra note 4, at 190 nn.2
& 3 (citing authorities); Prosser, supra note 11, at 3. But the doctrine was applied before
Butterfield. Turk, supra, at 190 n.8, (and authorities cited); Bohlem, Contributory Negligence,
in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 469 nn.51-53 (1924). Although it is undis-
puted that the doctrine developed at common law at the turn of the eighteenth century, there is
evidence of the rule in admiralty as early as 1691. In Ann of Mostein, Burrell, 23 Brit. Mar.
Cas. 263, 264, the court announced that "the Charles [was] in greatest fault, and ... cannot
recover."
21. E.g., Tuff v. Warman, 5 C.B. (n.s.) 573, 141 Eng. Rep. 231 (1857).
22. New York, for example, firmly established the doctrine in the following cases:
Tonawanda R.R. v. Munger, 5 Denio 255, 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844) (plaintiff who negli-
gently allowed cattle to wander onto railway cannot recover even if railroad company was
negligent); Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill 592, 593 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844) ("a plaintiff suing for
negligence must himself be without fault"); Brownell v. Flagler, 5 Hill 282, 283, and authori-
ties at 283 n.a (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (if both parties are negligent, neither can recover); Hart-
field v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615, 619 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839) ("if there be negligence on the part of
the plaintiff there cannot be recovery"); Rathbun & W. v. Payne, 19 Wend. 399, 400-01 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1838) ("a plaintiff suing for negligence must be wholly without fault").
23. A plaintiff's contributory negligence bars his recovery in Alabama, Delaware, Indi-
ana, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. H. WOODS, THE
NEGUGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT, app. (1978 & Supp. 1983); 5 SCHWARTZ, COM-
PARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974 & Supp. 1981).
24. Shrager & Shepherd, History, Development, and Analysis of the Pennsylvania Com-
parative Negligence Act: An Overview, 24 VILL. L. REv. 422, 425 n.22, 429-33 (1978-79)
(listing nine "inroads on the defense"); see also Prosser, supra note 11, at 4-7; Turk, supra
note 4, at 203-04; Schwartz, Li v. Yellow Cab Company: A Survey of California Practice
Under Comparative Negligence, 7 PAC. L.J. 747, 751-54 (1976). Legislatures also have recog-
nized the harsh result of contributory negligence, and this has led in part to the development of
workers' compensation laws. Mole & Wilson, supra note 11, at 606-07; Note, Intentional
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states introduced a crude form of comparative fault in order to miti-
gate the use of the defense." Although some states allowed the de-
fense to bar recovery even when the defendant acted recklessly,"
other states held that the doctrine applied only in cases of mutual
negligence.' 7 Many courts declined to apply the contributory negli-
gence bar to nuisance actions.' 8 Some courts engaged in questionable
Employer Torts and Workers' Compensation: A Legal Morass, 11 PAC. L.J. 187, 189 (1979).
25. See supra note 19; Fleming, Foreward: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judi-
cial Choice, 64 CALiF. L. REV. 239, 268 (1976); Goldberg, Judicial Adoption of Comparative
Fault in New Mexico: The Time Is at Hand, 10 N.M.L. REV. 3, 10-11 (1979-80); Prosser,
supra note 11, at 17-21; Comment, Comparative Negligence: Some New Problems for the
Maine Courts, 18 ME. L. REV. 65, 68-69 (1966).
26. Rowen v. New York, 59 Conn. 364, 20 A. 1073 (1890); Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn.
437 (1855); McDonald v. International & Great N. Ry., 86 Tex. 1, 22 S.W. 939 (1893);
International & Great N. Ry. v. Kuehn, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 21, 31 S.W. 322 (1895); Texas &
N.O. Ry. v. Brown, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 281, 21 S.W. 424 (1893); see also Smith v. Smith, 19
Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824) and 13 Am. Dec. 464, 467 (1824) (authorities approving Smith);
Bush v. Brainard, I Cow. 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823).
27. Highland Ave. & Belt R.R. v. Robbins, 124 Ala. 113, 118, 27 So. 422, 425 (1900);
Montgomery & Eufaula Ry. v. Stewart, 91 Ala. 421, 424-32, 8 So. 708, 711 (1890) (and
authorities cited); Carrington v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 88 Ala. 472, 477, 6 So. 910, 911
(1889) (citing authorities); Esrey v. Southern Pac. Co., 103 Cal. 541, 544-45, 37 P. 500, 502
(1894); Central R.R. & Banking Co. of Ga. v. Newman, 94 Ga. 560, 21 S.E. 219 (1894);
Lafayette & Indianapolis R.R. v. Adams, 26 Ind. 76 (1866); Boggess v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.,
37 W. Va. 297, 16 S.E. 525 (1892); Thurman v. Louisville & N. Ry., 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 1343,
1344-45, 34 S.W. 893, 894 (Ky. Ct. App. 1896) (not officially reported). Courts explained this
result in various ways: a defendant has a special duty to avoid wanton injury to a plaintiff,
Frazer v. South & North Ala. R.R., 81 Ala. 185, 197-200, 1 So. 85, 88-91 (1887); a defendant
owes a special duty to children or impaired persons, Battishill v. Humphreys, 6. Mich. 514,
520-21, 38 N.W. 581, 586 (1888); a "wanton" act by the defendant breaks the causal chain,
relieving the plaintiff of liability, Government St. R.R. v. Hanlon, 53 Ala. 70, 77 (1875).
Courts have noted that the concept of recklessness developed to mitigate the harsh contributory
negligence bar. Plyler v. Wheaton Van Lines, 640 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1981) (interpret-
ing California law). In Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W. 2d 105 (1962), the court
observed:
One of the main reasons for the growth of the doctrine of gross negligence
was to ameliorate the hardships of the common law doctrine of contributory
negligence .... [G]ross negligence[,] being defined as different in kind and not
in degree, could not be compared to ordinary negligence . . . . Various ...
statutes. . . also influenced the growth of the doctrine. . . to reach the socially
desirable result.
Id. at 16, 114 N.W.2d at 112.
28. See Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 76 N.W.2d 355, 73 A.L.R.2d 1368
(1956), affd, 7 Wis. 2d 556, 97 N.W.2d 385 (1959). When astute plaintiffs began contorting
causes of action in order to fit them under the nuisance umbrella and thus avoid the contribu-
tory negligence bar, courts responded by distinguishing between "negligent" and "absolute"
nuisances. Contributory negligence was applied to those nuisances characterized by negligence.
See, e.g., Terrell v. Alabama Water Serv. Co., 245 Ala. 68, 15 So. 2d 727 (1943); Calder v.
City & County of San Francisco, 50 Cal. App. 2d 837, 123 P.2d 897 (1942); Kelly v. Doddy,
115 N.Y. 575, 22 N.E. 1084 (1889).
Application of contributory negligence to cases of "absolute" nuisance (which included
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formulations of "direct" and "indirect" causation to avoid invoking
the defense,' 9 while others reached the same result by characterizing
plaintiffs' conduct as not negligent. 80 The contributory negligence
defense was not allowed in cases of liability based on statute, 81 nor
did it apply when the defendant had the "last clear chance" to avoid
the injury. 82 Finally, and most important to the current inquiry, the
courts uniformly rejected the contributory negligence defense when
the defendant acted intentionally.8"
The early cases addressing the application of contributory negli-
gence to a defendant's intentional conduct frequently involved plain-
tiffs who had suffered personal injury at the hands of defendant rail-
ways."' Although the reason for rejecting the contributory negligence
forms of liability greater than mere negligence such as strict liability, intentional conduct, and
statutory negligence) was the exception, not the rule. Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 1378 § 5 (1960).
Still, Prosser has noted that:
[Elven if the nuisance is a matter of intent, or of some abnormally dangerous
activity, the kind of contributory negligence which consists of voluntarily en-
countering a known danger, and often is called as assumption of risk, may still
be a defense. The plaintiff is not free to run recklessly into a known obstruction
in the street, skate on a pond from which he knows the ice has been cut, or walk
into the midst of visible dynamiting operations, and still hold the defendant re-
sponsible for his damages. In such cases there is a consent to take the risk, or
such an element of wilful misconduct on the part of the plaintiff that he is
barred from recovery in nuisance as in the case of any other tort.
W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 91 at 610 (footnotes omitted). As observed in Annot., 73
A.L.R.2d 1378, 1390 n.l1 (1960), "[tlhe case often cited as that originating the doctrine of
contributory negligence involved a fact situation which could well have been classified as a
deliberately created public nuisance, the obstruction of the highway by a pole extended across
part of the road." (citing Butterfield v. Forrester, 1 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 920 (1809)). The
general rule, however, was that contributory negligence did not bar recovery for intentional
nuisance. E.g., Hoffman v. Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 155 A. 499, 75 A.L.R. 1191 (1931); De-
ane v. Johnston, 104 So. 2d 3, 65 A.L.R.2d 957 (Fla. 1958).
29. T. COOLEY ON ToRTS, 1444-45 (3d ed. 1906); Prosser, supra note 11, at 25-28.
30. Shrager & Shepherd, supra note 24, at 426 n.24, observe a trend to let juries decide
if contributory negligence has occurred. See also Fleming, supra note 25, at 272-73.
31. T. SHEARMAN & S. REDFIELD ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE, § 62, at 90-92 (cases
cited and nn.2-3) (1898); Prosser, supra note 11, at 5-6; Schwartz, supra note 24, at 753. See
Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 138-39, 210 N.W.2d 58, 61-62 (1973) (defendant liable per
se for violation of criminal statute designed to protect minor plaintiffs from glue sniffing).
32. Battishill v. Humphreys, 64 Mich. 514, 520-21, 38 N.W. 581, 586 (1888); Davies
v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842); Prosser, supra note 11, at 6-7 (ex-
plaining the reason for the doctrine); Turk, supra note 4, at 204-05.
33. Prosser, supra note 11, at 4; Schwartz, supra note 24, at 752-53; Schrager & Shep-
herd, supra note 24, at 430-31; Turk, supra note 4, at 203.
34. Louisville & N. Ry. v. York, 128 Ala. 305, 308-09, 30 So. 676, 677 (1901); Ala-
bama Great S. R.R. v. Frazier, 93 Ala. 45, 47, 9 So. 303, 305 (1891); Tognazzini v. Freeman,
18 Cal. App. 468, 476, 123 P. 540, 544 (1912) (quoting authorities); Florida S. Ry. v. Hirst,
30 Fla. 1, 37, 11 So. 506, 513 (1892); Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Wurl, 62 I11. App. 381,
384 (1895); Ruter v. Foy, 46 Iowa 132, 132-33 (1877); Williams v. Railroad, 2 Mich. 259,
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defense in these cases was not often expressly articulated, one policy
consideration was that intentional tortfeasors should be punished 5
for their conduct by stripping them of the contributory negligence
defense. The desire of the common law to avoid aiding the inten-
tional wrongdoer is further exemplified by the longstanding rule
against contribution among intentional tortfeasors.3 Moreover, some
courts apparently sought to deal with intentional tortfeasors more
firmly in order to deter such future conduct."7 However, the most
clearly articulated policy consideration, frequently expressed in cases
of intentional personal injury, was circumvention of the harsh re-
sult" of the contributory negligence bar."9 In this way, courts fur-
thered the social policy goal of allowing recovery for physically in-
jured victims of intentional torts.
C. Modern Common Law: Contributory Negligence, Intentional
Torts, and Evolution of the "Different in Kind" Theory
At the turn of the twentieth century, courts began to articulate a
265-66 (1851) (citing authorities); McMahon v. Davidson, 12 Minn. 357 (Gil. 232, 249)
(1867) (stating the rule in dictum); Martin v. Wood, 5 N.Y.S. 274, 275 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889);
Brownell v. Flagler, 5 Hill 282, 284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); Moore v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry., 26 Okl. 682, 693, 110 P. 1059, 1063 (1910); Hawks v. Slusher, 55 Or. 1, 4, 104
P. 883, 885 (1909); Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. v. Zantzinger, 92 Tex. 365,
370-71, 48 S.W. 563, 566 (1898).
35. Bohlem, supra note 20, at 491.
36. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 50, at 305-08 nn.67-69 (4th ed. 1971). See generally
CAL. CIV. Pioc. CODE § 875(d) (West 1980); Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the
Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400-01 (1980); Comment,
Comparative Fault in Intentional Torts, 12 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 179, 181 & n.14, 195 & n.99
(1978) (discussing Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, 1955 Revision). Con-
tra Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Col., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 29, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d
851, 854 (1972).
37. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 27-28
(1941).
38. See authorities cited at note 24, supra.
39. See, e.g., Steinmetz v. Kelly, 72 Ind. 442, 446 (1880): "An intentional assault and
unlawful battery, inflicted upon a person, is an invasion of his right of personal security, for
which the law gives him redress, and of this redress he can not be deprived on the ground that
he was negligent and took no care to avoid such invasion of his right." See also Birmingham
Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Jones, 146 Ala. 277, 41 So. 146 (1906); Louisville & N. Ry. v.
York, 128 Ala. 305, 30 So. 676 (1901); Highland Ave. & B. Ry. v. Robbins, 124 Ala. 113, 27
So. 422 (1900); Louisville & N. Ry. v. Markee, 103 Ala. 160, 15 So. 511, 49 Am. St. Rep. 21
(1894); Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Hurt, 101 Ala. 34, 47, 13 So. 130, 133 (1893); Mont-
gomery & Eufaula Ry. v. Stewart, 91 Ala. 421, 8 So. 708 (1890); Louisville & N. Ry. v.
Watson, 90 Ala. 68, 69, 8 So. 249, 250 (1890); Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. McCoy, 81 Ky.
403, 414 (1883); Christian v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 12 So. 710, 711 (Miss. 1893). The same logic
was applied in recklessness cases. E.g., Aiken v. Holyoke Street Ry., 184 Mass. 269, 68 N.E.
238 (1903); Montgomery v. Lansing City Elec. Ry., 103 Mich. 46, 61 N.W. 543 (1894).
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more "legalistic" explanation for the policy against allowing contrib-
utory negligence to bar a plaintiff's recovery in intentional tort ac-
tions. In 1908, the Supreme Court of Kansas announced, without
citation to authority, that the inapplicability of contributory negli-
gence to intentional conduct was "based upon a theory of a differ-
ence in kind."'40 Apparently uncomfortable resting their decisions on
social policy reasons alone (i.e., punishment, deterrence, or circum-
vention of the contributory negligence bar), other courts soon em-
braced the different in kind theory. Chief among them was the Su-
preme Court of Michigan, which rearticulated the theory in Gibbard
v. Cursan,41 reasoning that "[i]f one willfully injures another . . .
he is guilty of more than negligence. The act is characterized by
willfullness, rather than by inadvertence, it transcends negli-
gence-[it] is different in kind." '14
The different in kind theory, coming as it did after most courts
had previously established that contributory negligence would not
apply in intentional personal injury torts, thus served to provide an
academic-sounding rationalization for a useful rule borne of sound
social policy. The different in kind theory gave apparent legal basis
for what courts had been doing instinctively for decades: seeking to
punish and deter intentional tortfeasors, and most important, pro-
tecting personally injured plaintiffs from the harsh bar of contribu-
tory negligence.
The different in kind theory received strong reinforcement.
Prosser embraced it-without citing authority-in his first hornbook
in 1941.41 Relying on Gibbard, the editors of American Jurispru-
dence stated in 1941 that the inapplicability of contributory negli-
gence to intentional torts rested on the theory that the two types of
conduct were "different in kind."4" The theory gained momentum in
the courts" and is today the accepted distinction between negligent
40. Atchison Ry. v. Baker, 79 Kan. 183, 189, 98 P. 804, 807 (1908). The distinction
had been brewing in other courts for over two decades previous to Atchison. E.g., Parker v.
Pennsylvania Co., 134 Ind. 673, 678, 34 N.E. 504, 506 (1893); Labarge v. Pere Marquette
Ry., 134 Mich. 139, 95 N.W. 1073 (1903); Redson v. Michigan Cent. Ry., 120 Mich. 671, 79
N.W. 939 (1899); Montgomery v. Lansing City Elec. Ry., 103 Mich. 46, 61 N.W. 543
(1894); Malmsten v. M. H. & 0. Ry., 49 Mich. 94, 13 N.E. 373 (1882); Baumeister v. Grand
Rapids & I. Ry., 63 Mich. 557, 30 N.W. 337 (1886); Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio
Ry. v. Zantzinger, 92 Tex. 365, 48 S.W. 563 (1898).
41. 225 Mich. 311, 320.22, 196 N.W. 398, 401-02 (1923).
42. Id. at 320, 196 N.W. at 401.
43. W. PnossERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TonS 402 (1941).
44. 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 178, at 855 (1941).
45. E.g., Cawog v. Rothbaum, 165 Cal. App. 2d 577, 588-91, 331 P.2d 1063, 1069-71
(1958); Wright v. Carey, 169 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
[Vol. 24
1984] INTENTIONAL TORTS 11
and intentional conduct."
Ill. THE NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF FAULT: LEGAL
DOCTRINE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND COMPARATIVE FAULT IN
INTENTIONAL TORTS
With the advent of comparative fault and the rejection of con-
tributory negligence in most states, 7 one major policy reason for ig-
noring the plaintiff's negligent conduct when an intentional tort is
alleged-that of avoiding a bar to recovery4 8-is gone. The justifica-
tion for retaining the rule must now rest, if at all, either on the
theory of different in kind, or on the policies of deterrence, punish-
ment, and avoidance of sanctioning self-help by defendants.
A. The Theory of Different in Kind
Courts traditionally have distinguished between classifications
of fault in order to allocate sanctions fitting the conduct in ques-
tion.49 Before probing into the nature of these distinctions, it will be
helpful to discuss the nature of fault itself.
The concept of fault is fairly new to tort law. Only toward the
end of the nineteenth century did courts begin generally to predicate
liability on fault, or as it was then often expressed, "moral responsi-
46. E.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 65, at 426. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 22.5, at 1211 (1956); 5 SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, § 5.2, at 101; H. WOODS,
supra note 23, § 7-7.1, and cases cited at 160 n.8; Shrager & Shepherd, supra note 24, at 430
n.48, 439-40; Timby & Plerak, The Effect of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute
on Traditional Tort Concepts and Doctrines, 24 Via. L. REV. 453, 464 (1978-79). The rule
is universally applied by the courts, although often in conclusory fashion. Butler v. Olshan,
280 Ala. 181, 194, 191 So. 2d 7, 19 (1966); Jackson v. Brantly, 378 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1979); Frontier Motors v. Horrall, 17 Ariz. App. 198, 201, 496 P.2d 624, 627
(1972); Civille v. Bullis, 209 Cal. App. 2d 134, 138, 25 Cal. Rptr. 578, 581 (1962); Villines v.
Tomerlin, 206 Cal. App. 2d 448, 458, 23 Cal. Rptr. 617, 623 (1962); Tate v. Cononica, 180
Cal. App. 2d 898, 909, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 36 (1960) (citing cases); Richardson v. Pridmore, 97
Cal. App. 2d 124, 131, 217 P.2d 113, 118 (1950); Goldman v. House, 93 Cal. App. 2d 572,
575, 209 P.2d 639, 641-42 (1949); White v. Gill, 309 So. 2d 744, 746 (La. Ct. App. 1975);
South Tex. Lloyds v. Jones, 273 So. 2d 853, 855 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Jenkins v. North
Carolina Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 560, 564, 94 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1956); City of
Garland v. White, 368 S.W.2d 12, 17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Moore v. El Paso Chamber of
Commerce, 220 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Wright v. Carey, 169 S.W.2d 749,
750-51 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Berkeley Bank for Corps. v. Miebos, 607 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah
1980); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 887 (W. Va. 1979).
47. See supra note 23.
48. See supra notes 24-39 and accompanying text.
49. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. (pts. 1-3)
315, 383, 441, 455-56 (1894).
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bility." 8 Before then, liability was based almost solely on causa-
tion;81 since then, legal scholars have argued about what fault is."'
Prosser suggests that, in its broadest sense, " 'fault' means nothing
more than a departure from a standard of conduct required of a man
by society for the protection of his neighbors."" But before we can
consider whether the three traditional classifications" of
fault-negligent, reckless, and intentional conduct-are different in
kind from one another, it is necessary to investigate further what we
mean when we speak of fault.
This inquiry begins by analyzing selected relevant prima facie
standards for each of the three general categories of fault. We will
look not only to the traditional legal "terms of art" used to describe
these classifications, but more importantly, we will attempt to articu-
late the general social norm that underlies these terms and classifica-
tions. Finally, we will critically analyze the evidence and premises
supporting the assertion that classifications of fault are, on a theoret-
ical level, substantively distinct to such an extent as to make them
different in kind.
1. Fault and Violation of the Social Norm
To establish a cause of action based on fault," plaintiff must
show, at a minimum, that defendant violated a basic social norm to a
certain degree. This norm, it is suggested, is that persons should not
knowingly engage in conduct that poses unjustifiable harm to others.
For convenience of discussion, the diagram below sets out the tradi-
tional terms of art used to describe the three classifications of fault,
as well as the norm posited to underlie those classifications.
The norm articulated below suggests what might be termed the
dual basis of our conception of fault;" its two components express
both the moral and the social elements of fault. The proscription
against knowingly engaging in certain activity reflects the moral as-
50. See O.W. HoLmEs, THE CoMMoN LAW 144-63 (1881); Issacs, Fault and Liability,
31 HARv. L. REV. 954, 966 (1918).
51. W. PRoss.R, supra note 19, § 75, at 492.
52. Id. at 492-94.
53. Id. at 493.
54. Wigmore, supra note 49, at 455-56.
55. See W. PRossEit, supra note 19, § 75, at 493.
56. See W. PuossER, supra note 19, § 4, at 17-19 (discussing the moral and social
aspects of fault).
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Social Norm Classifications of Fault
Negligence o-,----1 Recklessness A 0- Intent
Persons should Actor knew or Actor knew or Actor Actor Actor
not knowingly should have really should intentionally knew purposefully
known have known encountered a
known risk
engage in that his that his that that his acted
conduct that conduct posed conduct posed posed a conduct to
poses an a was
unjustifiable unreasonable highly highly substantially produce
ha rn risk of harin unreasonable unreasonable certain to the resulting
risk of harin risk of harm cause harm harm
pect of the defendant's conduct.6 As will be shown below, this
knowledge component is satisfied either by actual or attributed
knowledge on the part of the defendant. The second element of the
norm proscribes socially unjustifiable conduct. With regard to this
component of the norm we are concerned on the one hand with risk,
or probability of harm. Courts balance the magnitude of this risk
against the social utility or desirability of the subject conduct."
It is suggested that all three classifications of fault are premised
on violation of the above-described norm. The traditional differences
in classification can be ascribed to the degree to which the subject
conduct in each case is perceived to violate the two components of the
norm. Because classification of fault is based on the degree of viola-
tion of the norm, it is clear that classifications are indeed different.
Further, it is important to recognize the important function that la-
beling serves in facilitating communication about particular conduct.
It is crucial, however, to emphasize in what way classifications of
fault are different.
"Negligent fault" least violates the norm. With regard to this
classification we do not require of the actor a high degree of knowl-
edge; in fact, courts do not at all subjectively examine the actor's
mind. Instead we attribute5' to the actor a relatively low degree of
objective knowledge. We say that he either knew, or should have
57. Id. at 16-19.
58. When, in addition to proving a legally sufficient violation of the two components of
the above norm, a plaintiff can also prove the other elements of the cause of action-subject
act, cause, proximate cause, and in some cases damages-and further, absent proof of a defense
or privilege, then we can say that defendant is liable to plaintiff.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TonTs, § 290 comment (a), § 289 comment (b)
(1965).
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known, that his conduct was socially unjustified. ° Courts also re-
quire for negligence a relatively low standard of social justifiability.
We measure the social justification of the conduct by balancing the
magnitude of the risk created by the conduct against the social utility
of the conduct. When risk outweighs social utility, we say that the
conduct is not socially justified because it poses an unreasonable risk
of harm.1
What the courts classify as "recklessness" contemplates yet a
greater violation of the norm. We recognize two ways to satisfy the
,knowledge element of the norm violation. We may attribute to the
actor a relatively high degree of objective knowledge6 by saying that
he "really" should have known that his conduct was socially unjusti-
fied. Alternatively we may probe the actor's subjective mind to dis-
cover whether he intentionally encountered a known risk.6" By using
either method we require a high degree of knowledge regarding the
norm violation. Similarly, we require for recklessness a high degree
of social unjustifiability. We typically express this by saying that the
actor's conduct poses a highly unreasonable risk of harm."
"Intentional fault" most forcefully violates both the moral and
social components of the norm. Under this classification we again
recognize two ways to satisfy the norm violation. To meet the first
branch of intentional fault, we ask whether the actor knew that his
conduct was substantially certain to cause harm." Thus we require
a somewhat more dramatic violation of the knowledge component of
the norm, and a very high degree of violation of the social justifiabil-
ity component. In fact, with regard to conduct "substantially certain"
to cause harm, courts effectively presume violation of the social justi-
fication component. But when we consider that proof of a common
law privilege will completely justify the actor's conduct, we realize
that even with regard to conduct substantially certain to cause harm
we engage in balancing in order to determine social justification.
The second branch of the intentional fault classification contem-
plates the ultimate degree of violation of both components of the
norm. As in the first branch, we analyze the actor's subjective mind.
We inquire whether he acted with the highest degree of knowledge
by asking if he purposefully acted to produce the socially unjustifi-
60. Id.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 291 comment (d) (1965).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 500 comment (a) (1965).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A comment (b) (1965).
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able result."' We also undertake the most exacting scrutiny of socialjustifiability by asking if his purposeful act was done to produce the
resulting harm. 7 Like the other branch of the intentional fault clas-
sification, this amounts to a presumptive violation of the social justi-
fication component of the norm. But again, considering the role of
intentional tort privileges, it is clear that even at this highest degree
of norm violation we engage in an analysis of social justifica-
tion-the court will sanction as "justifiable" even conduct designed
to produce the resulting harm, so long as a traditional privilege pro-
tects the actor's conduct.
2. Are the Classifications of Fault Substantively Different?
Is there support for the assertion commonly made that classifi-
cations of fault are on a theoretical level substantively distinct to such
an extent as to make the classifications "different in kind"? Some
have argued that because intentional tortfeasors "intend" the result,
and negligent or reckless tortfeasors need not intend harm to be held
at fault, the two classifications are contradictory and therefore sub-
stantively different." But as explained above, the knowledge aspects
of intentional fault are but higher degrees of the same knowledge
component that courts attribute objectively to every negligent and to
some reckless tortfeasors. Thus, distinguishing the two classifications
on the basis of "intent" and "no intent" ignores the fact that each
classification has a knowledge component that must be met. The dif-
ference in classification, as far as the knowledge component is con-
cerned, is accounted for by the degree of knowledge we re-
quire-from a low level of objective knowledge (negligence) to a very
high level of subjective knowledge (intent).
Although it is agreed that the three classifications of fault are
different, this difference can be attributed to the degree to which our
fact finders perceive the subject conduct as violating the moral and
social components of the above norm. The three classifications reflect
not different norms, but simply shades of violation of the same norm.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863, 118 P.2d 465 (1941):
Negligence is an unintentional tort. . . . A negligent person has no desire
to cause the harm that results from his carelessness, and he must be distin-
guished from a person guilty of willful misconduct, such as assault and battery,
who intends to cause harm. Willfulness and negligence are contradictory terms.
If conduct is negligent, it is not willful; if it is willful, it is not negligent.
Id. at 869, 118 P.2d at 468 (citations omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS,
§ 500 comment (f) (1965).
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It follows that if classifications of fault are thus distinguished (as the
Restatement suggests) 9 by degree, comparisons between classifica-
tions can be made while retaining theoretical consistency. In other
words, because the different in kind theory is without foundation,
there is no theoretical obstacle to extending comparative fault princi-
ples to intentional torts.
3. Judicial Challenges to the Different in Kind Theory
Because courts for the past eighty years have made distinctions
between classifications of fault based on supposed differences in kind
rather than degree, courts today balk at the idea of comparing con-
duct that is asserted to be organically different. Accordingly, courts
that adhere to the different in kind theory do not view fault as a
continuum of the degree of norm violation, but instead as separate
and defined categories of behavior distinct from each other. And yet,
in many situations, these distinctions are difficult, if not impossible
to make.7 0 Writers have observed that the lines between classifica-
tions of negligence are more imagined than real," and courts have
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A comment (b) states:
As the probability that the consequences will follow decreases, and becomes less
than substantial certainty, the actor's conduct loses the character of intent, and
becomes mere recklessness, as defined in § 500. As the probability decreases
further, and amounts only to a risk that the result will follow, it becomes ordi-
nary negligence, as defined in § 282.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A comment (b) (1965). But curiously, the Restate-
ment also suggests that "difference in the degree" may be so "marked as to amount substan-
tially to a difference in kind." Id. § 500 comment (g). The Restatement offers no support for
this view. The apparent inconsistency with other language in the Restatement may reflect
simply an attempt by its writers to effect a superficial compromise with existing precedents.
This, however, is no theoretical justification for the assertion that classifications of negligence
and recklessness are different in kind. We should conclude, as does Schwartz, that there is no
support in the Restatement for the statement made in § 500 comment (g). See 5 SCHWARTZ,
supra note 23, at 5-6 (Cal. Supp.).
70. Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863, 869, 118 P.2d 465, 468 (1941).
Although the court found negligence and intent different in kind, it added that, "lilt is fre-
quently difficult, however, to characterize conduct as willful or negligent." Id. But see Green,
Illinois Negligence Law, (pts. 1-3) 39 ILL. L. REV. 36 (1944) (listing cases in which the
Illinois Supreme Court has maintained that "negligence and willfulness are as unmixable as
oil and water"); 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 178, 854-55 (1941) (asserting that the distinction
between recklessness, negligence and intentional conduct is well defined).
71. "As the probability of injury to another, apparent from the facts within his knowl-
edge, becomes greater, his conduct takes on more of the attributes of intent, until it reaches
that substantial certainty of harm which juries, and sometimes courts, may find inseparate
from intent itself." W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 31, at 145-46 (footnote omitted). See gener-
ally Mole & Wilson, supra note 11, at (pt. 1) 334 and authorities cited at nn.53-57. Contra,
Brady, Recklessness, Negligence, Indifference and Awareness, 43 MoD. L. REV. 381, 383
(1980) (suggesting there are six "degrees" of recklessness). But see Winslade, Brady on Reck-
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struggled to label conduct as negligent, reckless, or intentional."' For
example, the court in Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals7' noted that
under the facts of the case, either battery or recklessness could have
been alleged. 4 The court stated that "the two liability concepts are
not necessarily opposed one to the other. Rather, recklessness under
§ 500 of the Restatement might be regarded, for the purpose of anal-
ysis at least, as a lesser included act."'75 In a similarly candid vein,
the Supreme Court of Florida has stated that "the distinction be-
tween intent and negligence boils down to a matter of degree. '"7' In
Bielski v. Schulze,7 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin abolished the
doctrine of gross negligence, or recklessness, and dismissed the idea
that negligence and recklessness are different "in kind."'7'  And re-
cently, in Sorensen v. Allred, 79 the California Court of Appeal sug-
gested that abolishing "shades of negligence or other categorizations
of fault would . . . streamlin[e] . . . the trial of cases." 80
Thus, if one accepts the proposition that classifications of fault
represent merely a continuum of the degree of violation of a common
lessness, 33 ANALYSIS 32 (1972); Winslade, Recklessness, 30 ANALYSIS 135 (1970) (arguing
that the lines are blurred).
72. Prosser has observed that "the dividing line between intent and negligence has not
always proved easy to draw." W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 91, at 609. See also id. § 31, at
145-46; Comment, supra note 36, at 189, cases and authorities cited at n.58.
73. 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
74. Id. at 524. See, e.g., Comment, 11 RuT.-CAM. L. REV. 497 (1980); Note, Profes-
sional Sports and Tort Liability: A Victory for the Intentionally Injured Player, 1980 DET.
C.L. REV. 687; Note, Torts in Sports-Deterring Violence in Professional Athletics, 48 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 764 (1980).
75. Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 524. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A
comment (b), quoted supra note 69; 5 SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 5-6 (Cal. Supp.); Mathe-
son v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980) (plaintiff's original suit for battery with a tootsie
pop might alternatively be pleaded as recklessness in order to avoid the bar imposed by statute
of limitations); Sandifer Motors Inc. v. City of Roeland Park, 6 Kan. App. 2d 308, 628 P.2d
239 (1981). In Sandifer the court of appeals characterized what seems to have been intentional
conduct as negligence in order to apply comparative fault principles. See infra notes 157-160
and accompanying text.
76. Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1972).
77. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
78. "Gradually, gross negligence acquired by metamorphosis a new nature: - ordinary
negligence lay in the field of inadvertence but gross negligence in the field of actual or con-
structive intent to injure, and the two did not grade into each other." Id. at 15, 114 N.W.2d at
112 (footnote omitted). The court concluded that the tort law of Wisconsin could do well
without the doctrine: "gross negligence as a vehicle of social policy no longer fulfills a purpose
in comparative negligence." Id. at 7, 114 N.W.2d at 113.
79. 112 Cal App. 3d 717, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1980).
80. Id. at 725, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 446. The court continued: "[tihe submission to triers of
fact, particularly juries, of issues of liability upon the simply stated question, 'Whose fault was
it, and, if both are at fault, what are the degrees of each,' places the issues in a context more
readily understood." Id.
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social norm, the suggestion that fault can be classified into conduct
"different in kind" seems without theoretical foundation. If this is
the case, rejection of comparative fault when an intentional tort is
alleged against a defendant must rest solely on social policy
considerations.
B. Deterrence, Punishment, and Avoidance of Sanctioning Self-
Help by Defendants
Although the asserted primary purpose of tort law is compensa-
tion of plaintiffs,"1 some writers have noted that judgments them-
selves serve to deter "repetition of . . wrongful conduct and serve
as a warning to others who are inclined to commit similar wrongs,"
and that imposition of liability fulfills an "admonitory function" by
punishing the tortfeasor." Closely related is the idea that tort law
provides an organized and controlled forum for meting out social ret-
ribution. 8 The argument follows that these ancillary attributes of
the tort system are all the more desirable in cases of intentional
wrongdoing; that by treating an intentionally acting tortfeasor more
harshly" than his negligent counterpart, future conduct will be de-
terred, present conduct will be punished, and society's need for vin-
dication will be satisfied.
Still, it may be questioned whether prospective intentional
tortfeasors are actually deterred by the current rule." Indeed, the
81. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 2, at 6.
82. E.g., Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1172, 1174-77
(1931); Note, Exemplary Damages in The Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 520 (1957);
Note, In Defense of Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 303, 305 (1980). The deterrence
justification for contributory negligence has been thoroughly discredited by Fleming, supra
note 25, at 243-44. O'Connel, however, asserts that anything short of full recovery for the
plaintiff seriously reduces the deterrent effect of tort law. O'Connel, A Proposal to Abolish
Contributory and Comparative Fault, With Compensatory Savings by Also Abolishing the Col-
lateral Source Rule, 1979 LAW FORUM 591.
83. "If people would gratify the passion of revenge outside of the law, if the law did not
help them, the law has no choice but to satisfy the craving itself, and thus avoid the greater evil
of private retribution." OW. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41-42 (1881). See generally Mor-
ris, supra note 82, at 1173; Note, Exemplary Damages, supra note 82, at 521-22.
84. Traditionally, intentional tortfeasors, in comparison to negligent actors, have been
denied contribution and the use of the contributory negligence defense, and have been subject
to punitive damages.
85. Note, The Tie That Binds: Liability of Intentional Tort-Feasors for Extended Con-
sequences, 14 STAN. L. REV. 362, 365 (1962); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130, 133-34 (1932). With respect to the notion of deterrence in
recklessness actions, see Sorensen v. Allred, 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 725, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441,
446 (1980). A similar criticism of the antideterrent effect of the traditional rule has been
recognized with regard to the old "active/passive" distinction (Leflar, supra at 156-58) for
invoking contribution or indemnity. Traditional doctrine produces the illogical effect of con-
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tenuous deterrent argument has recently been rejected in favor of
expanding the application of comparative fault in strict tort liabil-
ity88 and in recklessness81  actions. Further, punishment, if it is to
remain a goal of tort law, can be achieved by imposing punitive
damages. 88 And yet, there are additional valid considerations of so-
cial policy that support the traditional rule with regard to many in-
tentional torts.
Some types of intentional torts are by their nature so offensive
to our customs and values that we should as a matter of social policy
decline to apply comparative fault principles, lest the courts appear
to sanction or facilitate the proscribed conduct. "Self-help" measures
resulting in damage to persons or property would be the most obvi-
ous conduct included in this category. Thus, in a typical battery, as-
sault or trespass case, although the different in kind theory of fault
should not itself prevent comparison of a defendant's fault with a
plaintiff's negligent or reckless conduct, social policy considerations
should prevent such a comparison. In other intentional tort cases not
reflecting self-help-for example, nuisance-the defendant's conduct,
although it may violate the social norm, often will not reflect the
same degree of social opprobrium that attaches to battery.
By a battery, a defendant effectively takes the law into his own
hands. This vigilante aspect, in conjunction with an offensive physi-
doning negligent or even reckless conduct by tortfeasors who operate with another "more
faulty" defendant deemed to have acted intentionally. Thus, in Gardner v. Murphy, 54 Cal.
App. 3d 164, 126 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1975), a negligent codefendant whose fault was termed
"passive" escaped all liability simply because the other defendant, whose fault was termed
"active," acted intentionally. But "[b]y allowing a negligent tortfeasor to escape all the conse-
quences of his own acts through indemnity, the California courts in effect give him the same
status as a negligent tortfeasor in an intentional tort action." Comment, supra note 36, at 193.
One writer has questioned, "[i]s there any sound public policy which justifies a rule of law
which exculpates from liability an admitted wrongdoer merely because a second wrongdoer has
intervened and assisted in causing the plaintiff harm"? Eldredge, Culpable Intervention As
Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 121, 129 (1937). Courts have, however, held a negli-
gent codefendant fully liable when the intentionally acting codefendant is judgment-proof.
Comment, supra note 36, at 194 n.86. Finally, it has been observed that the rule denying
contribution among intentional tortfeasors might actually increase a wrongdoer's willingness to
engage in tortious conduct. Leflar, supra at 135-37.
86. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737-38, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 387 (1978).
87. Sorensen v. Alired, 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 725, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441, 446 (1980);
Jarvis v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 246, 255-56, 191 Cal. Rptr. 29, 34
(1983); Zavala v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 125 Cal. App. 3d 646, 650, 178 Cal. Rptr. 185,
187 (1981); Southern Pac. v. State, 115 Cal. App. 3d 116, 171 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1981); Plyler v.
Wheaton Van Lines, 640 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1981).
88. Comment, supra note 36, at 199 nn.123-25.
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cal touching, directly challenges a fundamental tenet of civilized con-
duct. However, although battery reflects self-help (that is, deliberate
change from appropriate social behavior to norm-violating behavior),
many nuisance cases reflect at the most complacent, albeit deliberate,
willingness to allow existing norm-violating conditions to continue. A
nuisance typically does not offend our social values to the same ex-
tent as a battery because the deliberate change in behavior that char-
acterizes self-help is absent. In this regard, an intentional nuisance
may be no more socially offensive than "mere" negligent or reckless
conduct. Therefore, when the facts of an intentional nuisance case
indicate absence of self-help, social policy considerations would not
prevent application of comparative fault principles.
Social policy considerations of avoiding the appearance of sanc-
tioning or facilitating self-help should be the key to whether compar-
ative fault should be applied in a given case. When courts decline to
apply comparative fault in intentional torts, they should do so ex-
pressly for reasons of social policy and not because of formalistic ad-
herence to an ill-conceived notion that negligent, reckless and inten-
tional torts are different in kind.
IV. RECENT CASES: THE TREND TOWARD COMPARISON
As shown above, social policy considerations militate against ex-
tension of comparative fault in many intentional tort cases. However,
under circumstances in which application of comparative fault could
not be seen as facilitating or sanctioning self-help, social policy con-
siderations argue for, not against, extension of comparative fault. As
recent recklessness, strict liability, and contribution cases discussed
below demonstrate, there is a strong policy objective to be achieved
by fully analyzing a plaintiff's conduct, and by reducing his damages
accordingly. The lengths to which some courts have reached to ac-
complish this policy in battery suits is striking testimony both to the
desirability of a rule that would allow full consideration of all par-
ties' conduct, regardless of classification of fault, and to the dangers
of unrestrained application of the comparative fault rule. Finally, re-
cent intentional nuisance cases analyzed below dramatize the conflict
courts face in attempting on the one hand to apply the law as it
exists, and on the other hand, to achieve socially desirable results
consistent with comparative fault principles.
[Vol. 24
1984] INTENTIONAL TORTS
A. Rejection of the Different in Kind Theory in Favor of Compari-
son: Recklessness, Strict Liability, and Contribution
1. Recklessness
Although some commentators still maintain that recklessness
and negligence are different in kind and should not be compared,8 9
courts recently have applied comparative fault principles in such
cases. In Sorensen v. Allred,0 for example, the California Court of
Appeal held that a plaintiff's contributing negligence should be com-
pared to a defendant's recklessness.9" In doing so, the court noted
that "no defensible reason exists for categorizing willful and wanton
misconduct as a different kind of negligence not suitable for compari-
son with any other kind of negligence."92 The Sorensen court further
suggested that, even if the two types of conduct were considered dif-
ferent not only in degree but in kind as well, comparison should still
be allowed purely on the basis of social policy to attain a more com-
prehensive system of comparative fault.9 8
2. Strict Tort Liability
It has been easier for courts to explain extending comparative
fault analysis to cases involving recklessness than to cases involving
strict tort liability. In the recklessness context, courts can apply com-
parative principles based either on the social policy goal of promot-
89. Schrager & Shepherd, supra note 24, at 440-41. Contra Schwartz, supra note 24, at
1480.
90. 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1980).
91. Id. at 725, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 446. The Sorensen court would allow comparison in
all cases involving conduct "traditionally described as willful and wanton." Id. at 726, 169
Cal. Rptr. at 446. In doing so the court distinguished Kindt v. Kaufman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845,
129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976) (contributory negligence not a defense to charge of willful miscon-
duct). See Southern Pac. v. State, 115 Cal. App. 116, 121, 171 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190-91 (1981)
(the category of fault termed "willful misconduct" (recklessness), which was designed to avoid
the contributory negligence bar, is unnecessary under a comparative fault system). Sorensen
was followed in Zavala v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 125 Cal. App. 3d 646, 650, 178 Cal. Rptr.
185, 187 (1981) and by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying California law, in Plyler
v. Wheaton Van Lines, 640 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (1981). See also Jarvis v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 246, 255-56, 191 Cal. Rptr. 29, 34 (1983).
92. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 722-23, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 446. See also 5 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 23, at 6 (Cal. Supp.) (asserting that there is no difference between "objective recklessness"
and negligence).
93. 112 Cal. App. 3d at 725, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 444, (quoting 5 SCHWARTZ, supra note
23, § 5.3, at 108). The court noted that "[t]he elimination of willful misconduct as a bar to
recovery offers justice to both plaintiffs and defendants in situations where it is now all or
nothing." Id. at 726, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 446. See also Li v. Yellow Cab. Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804,
825-26, 532 P.2d 1226, 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 873 (1975).
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ing equitable allocation of loss, or by rejection of the theory of differ-
ent in kind." But only attainment of the social policy goal justifies
extension of comparative principles to strict tort liability, because
fault and no-fault are truly conduct different in kind.' The Califor-
nia Supreme Court recognized this in Daly v. General Motors
Corp.," in which it allowed a plaintiff's negligence to be compared
to a defendant's strict tort liability." The court noted that "[f]ixed
semantic consistency at this point is less important than the attain-
ment of a just and equitable result. The interweaving of concept and
terminology in this area suggests a judicial posture that is flexible
rather than doctrinaire.' ' 8
Although some courts and commentators continue to protest
that negligence and strict tort liability should not be compared be-
cause they are truly different in kind," the trend favors extending
94. The Sorensen court, supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text, was apparently pre-
pared to base its decision on either ground.
95. One commentator has attempted to harmonize the comparison of fault and no-fault
by arguing that strict liability is simply another form of fault. Carestia, Comparative Princi-
ples and Products Liability in Montana, 41 MoNT. L. REv. 269, 271-72 (1980). See also
Davis, Product Liability Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and The
Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 513, 537 (1980); Fleming,
supra note 25, at 270.
Another theory recently advanced for the extension of comparative fault to strict liability
is found in Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 452, 618 P.2d 788, 798 (1980). The
Kennedy court interpreted the term "negligence" in the Kansas comparative negligence statute
to mean "causation," and proceeded to apply comparative principles to a defendant liable
under strict liability. Such an approach disregards the fundamental difference between fault
and causation.
Apportionment based on fault is a rough approximation of the liability of the parties.
Admittedly the allocation is not an exact or scientific one; the use of comparative fault stems
from the idea that when causation is attributable to more than one party it is better to apply a
rough distribution of the loss between the parties than to unduly burden or benefit one side by
fully granting or completely denying recovery.
Apportionment based on cause, on the other hand, rests on the premise that the compo-
nent parts of the total damage figure can be isolated and assigned to the party causally respon-
sible. The theory by definition rejects the idea that two actors have concurred to cause a result;
it posits a state of isolated causation not descriptive of the vast majority of cases involving
mutual causes.
96. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
97. Id. at 734, 575 P.2d at 1164, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385. In comparison, the Sorensen
court noted that it was easier to rationalize the use of comparative fault in recklessness cases:
"[wle are ...not comparing apples and oranges ...but rather two varieties of oranges
(simple negligence versus gross negligence) or at worst oranges and lemons. . . ." Sorensen v.
AlIred, 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 725, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441, 445 (1980).
98. 20 Cal. 3d at 736, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386. But see id. at 757-64,
575 P.2d at 1181-86, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 399-404 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
99. Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of
Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DiEwo L. REv. 337, 355 (1977); Note, 16 GONZ. L. REV. 247
(1980); Note, Products Liability, Comparative Negligence, and the Allocation of Damages
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comparative fault to strict tort liability. Writers supporting compari-
son of fault and no-fault have argued that the "attainment of a just
and equitable result must ultimately prevail if the system is to regain
balance and retain societal approval." 00 The Daly court followed
this approach, noting that the adoption of comparative negligence in
California was designed "to promote the equitable allocation of loss
among all parties legally responsible in proportion to their fault."' '
3. Contribution and Indemnity Among Defendants Liable for
Different Classifications of Fault
At common law, contribution and indemnity operated under
different rules.102 Although this remains so in many jurisdictions to-
day, 0  the introduction of comparative principles to apportion dam-
ages between defendants has blurred and in some cases obliterated
these distinctions.'" In states that apply comparative fault princi-
ples, the terms "partial indemnity," "partial contribution," "compar-
ative indemnity," or "comparative contribution" may be used to ex-
press the same notion. No matter what term is used, however, the
common issue is whether or not apportionment of damages will be
employed when the parties' liability rests on different classifications
of fault.
In earlier cases this determination often turned on whether the
conduct of the defendant could be termed active or passive.105 This
Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 73 (1976); Note, 56 WASH. L. REV. 307
(1980); Note, Comparative Negligence Collides with Strict Liability: Will Tort Law Ever be
the Same?, 19 WASHBURN L. REV. 76, 101-02 (1979). This trend has occurred despite the fact
that it requires courts to compare conduct truly different in kind. Note, Assumption of Risk as
the Only Affirmative Defense Available in Strict Products Liability Actions in Oregon: Baccel-
leri v. Huster Co., 17 WILLAMETTE L.J. 495 (1981); Note, 25 VILL. L. REV. 1072 (1979-80).
See numerous citations supporting adoption of comparative principles in strict tort liability
actions in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 740-41, 575 P.2d 1162, 1171, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 389 (1978).
100. Sales, Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort Liability-Prelude to
Comparative Fault, 11 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 729, 761 (1980) (footnote omitted). See generally
Fleming, supra note 25.
101. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 387 (1978).
102. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 51, at 310 (under contribution, loss was distributed
pro rata among tortfeasors; under indemnity, the entire loss was shifted to one tortfeasor).
103. Id.
104. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
105. Id. at 594-98, 578 P.2d at 908-12, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 192-95; Comment, supra note
36, at 181-99.
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distinction was rejected by the New York Court of Appeals,"' which
has stated that it will permit "apportionment of damages among
joint tort-feasors regardless of the degree or nature of the concurring
fault."107
Similarly, the California Supreme Court has extended partial
indemnity for social policy reasons, although the liability of one co-
defendant rested in negligence, and the other in strict liability. 0 8 Re-
jecting arguments that different bases of liability precluded compari-
son, the court stated that "the suggested [doctrinal] difficulties are
more theoretical than practical, and experience in other jurisdictions
demonstrates that juries are fully competent to apply comparative
fault principles between negligent and strictly liable defendants."1 09
The court noted that comparison was compelled in order to achieve
full allocation of responsibility for loss among all parties liable for
the damages.1 0
Extension of comparative fault principles to non-self-help inten-
tional torts can be based on policy considerations similar to those
that impelled courts to extend comparison to recklessness, strict lia-
bility, and contribution among defendants liable for different classifi-
cations of fault. With rare and well-founded exceptions," compara-
106. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 148, 282 N.E.2d 288, 292, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382, 387 (1972) (apportionment of damages between tortfeasors in negligence cases).
107. Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 29, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334
N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 (1972) (emphasis added). One writer has observed that this language seems
to embrace comparison of all forms of fault, including intentional conduct. See Comment,
supra note 36, at 192, 196 n.99. This is not an unreasonable reading of the case. Kelly speaks
of "distributfing] the loss in proportion to the allocable concurring fault." 31 N.Y.2d at 29,
286 N.E.2d at 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 854. See also Sorrentino v. United States, 344 F. Supp.
1308, 1309 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). But as yet no cases following either Kelly or Dole have gone so
far as to include intentional torts. Still, the decision is significant for its refutation of the differ-
ent in kind theory in favor of allocation of loss in proportion to fault. Kelly, 31 N.Y.2d at 29,
285 N.E.2d at 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 854. The Kelly court concluded, "[w]e believe the new
rule of apportionment to be pragmatically sound, as well as realistically fair." Id.
108. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr.
550 (1978).
109. Id. at 331, 579 P.2d at 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555 (and authorities cited).
110. Id. at 332, 579 P.2d at 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
111. Generally, a plaintiff's inadvertent negligence has no effect in cases based on liabil-
ity per se (violation of criminal statute) or related actions based on statutory strict liability
(violation of civil statute). This makes sense, because plaintiffs within the class of "helpless"
persons protected by a statute cannot be expected to exercise reasonable care for themselves.
See Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. 1981). In Seim the defendant dog owner was
held liable for a dog bite under a civil statute that imposed strict liability on dog owners. The
plaintiff, a seven-year-old girl, was negligent in petting the dog. The Minnesota Supreme
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tive fault principles are applied to almost every tort action except
intentional torts. Although exception of "self-help" intentional torts
is compelled by social policy considerations, those same considera-
tions would not prevent application of comparative fault to inten-
tional torts that are not characterized by self-help. Indeed, exclusion
of intentional non-self-help torts from comparative fault analysis vio-
lates important social policy goals. It results in inconsistent applica-
tion of comparative fault principles""m and incomplete consideration
of the question of plaintiff compensation. 18 It has the questionable
Court held that although comparative fault was the general rule in the state, and although
comparative fault had been extended to strict liability cases, nevertheless a defendant liable
under a civil statute could not compare his conduct with that of the plaintiff. The court recog-
nized that it applied what might be termed "absolute statutory strict liability." See also Zerby
v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 138-39, 210 N.W.2d 58, 61-62 (1973) (defendant liable per se for
violation of criminal statute designed to protect minor plaintiffs from glue sniffing).
112. See Sorensen v. Allred, 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1980), discussed
supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
113. The primary goal of tort law is compensation of plaintiffs. W. PROSSER, supra
note 19, § 2, at 7. Implicit in the notion of compensation is the idea that, unless an overriding
social policy mandates otherwise, a plaintiff should recover actual damages only for that por-
tion of the loss for which he is not at fault. Thus, in a typical non-self-help intentional nui-
sance case, if a plaintiff's fault has contributed in some degree to his damages, he should have
no right to demand that others compensate him for that portion of his loss. Such a plaintiff
who is, for example, 40% at fault for his $10,000 loss should have a right to recover only
$6,000 from the defendant. The plaintiff should have no legal right to compel others to com-
pensate him for the remaining $4,000. The law should treat this as a loss inflicted by the
plaintiff on himself.
Currently, of course, defendants against whom non-self-help intentional conduct is proved
are forced to pay full compensatory damages. Hence, plaintiffs themselves at fault but who are
victims of non-self-help intentional torts receive a windfall when it comes time to determine
compensatory damages. Negligent and even reckless plaintiffs are therefore rewarded for the
fortuity of their having concurred with non-self-help intentional tortfeasors to cause damage to
themselves.
Failure of the courts to provide for comparison in appropriate intentional tort cases also
ignores the realities of jury decision making. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 67, at 433, writes
that "juries are notoriously inclined . . . to [disregard the court's instructions and to] make
some more or less haphazard reduction of the plaintiff's damages in proportion to his fault."
See also Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence, Needed Law Reform, 11 U.
FLA. L. REV. 135, 144-45 (1958) ("in many cases the jurors will disregard instructions on the
law and 'do equity' as they see it"). In Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430,
281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938), the court said, "[w]e but blind our eyes to obvious reality to the
extent that we ignore the fact that in many cases juries apply [apportionment of damages] in
spite of [the court's instructions]." In a candid opinion, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955) affirmed a verdict in which the jury
applied comparative negligence to reduce a plaintiff's damages even though the doctrine of
contributory negligence prevailed at the time:
The doctrine of comparative negligence, or degrees of negligence, is not
recognized by the Courts of Pennsylvania, but as a practical matter they are
frequently taken into consideration by a jury. The net result . . . is that . . .
the jury brings in a compromise verdict . . . much smaller in amount than they
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and unnecessary114 effect of ignoring and, by inaction, condoning
negligent or reckless conduct by plaintiffs. At the same time the de-
terrent value of allowing full recovery is at best suspect, 1 ' and the
punishment goal, if it is a valid consideration of tort law, can be
attained through imposition of punitive damages.""
B. Trends Toward Comparison in Intentional Torts: Battery and
Nuisance
Although some courts have struggled to attain equitable results
through application of comparative fault principles in intentional
torts, the cases thus. far demonstrate unfortunate confusion as to the
proper role of social policy considerations. In a number of cases,
courts of the southern states have violated the approach proposed in
would have awarded . . . if they were convinced that the plaintiffs were free
from contributory negligence.
Id. at 234-35, 114 A.2d at 154. Cf H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
In their study of criminal juries, the authors made numerous observations of jurors' tendencies
to consider conduct of the victim, in direct disregard of instructions. Id., Contributory Fault of
the Victim, at 242-57. They observed that "cases having a de minimus cast or a note of contrib-
utory fault or provocation . . . present . . . occasions for . . . the jury (to] exercise its de facto
power to write . . . equities into the criminal law." Id. at 285.
114. The contributory negligence rule was necessary, according to the early common
law, because of the "impossibility" of apportioning damages. Needham v. San Francisco &
S.J. Ry. Co., 37 Cal. 409 (1869). In reality, the courts feared that juries might be inclined to
award unreasonable sums to plaintiffs at the expense of growing industries. See T. SHEARMAN
& S. REDFIELD, supra note 31, at § 63 (1898); Prosser, supra note 11, at 4; Goldberg, supra
note 25 at 3-5; Turk, supra note 4, explains that:
When . . . big and remote corporate defendants, especially railroads, entered
the scene, the average juror, often regarding such defendants to be intruders as
well as immensely rich, became plaintiff-minded. By adoption of the doctrine of
contributory negligence, a court could, in many cases, find a welcome means by
which to control, or even to eliminate, the jury. Specific features of plaintiff
behavior, acts or omissions which would be apt to recur frequently in special
types of cases, as for instance in railroad crossing accidents, could be handled by
rule-of-thumb judgments, soon to be regarded as rules of law, leaving nothing to
be considered by the jury. Thus, the issue of contributory negligence came to be
"an ingenious device which gave the court almost complete freedom to accept or
reject jury participation at its pleasure."
Id. at 198-99 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negli-
gence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151, 155-59 (1946)). Apparently this was never a problem in the
admiralty courts which used a form of apportionment, but did not depend on juries. T.
SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, supra note 31, § 63 (1898). But now that courts are comfortable
allowing juries to apportion damages even between negligent and strictly liable parties (see
e.g., supra notes 94-101, 108-110 and accompanying text; Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20
Cal. 3d 725, 738-39, 575 P.2d 1162, 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 388 (1978)), there is no reason
to believe juries are unable to apportion liability between two parties who are at fault, albeit
negligence or recklessness versus intentional fault.
115. See supra notes 82 and 85 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
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this article, by allowing comparison even when the defendant's inten-
tional conduct constituted self-help. Conversely, other courts have
declined to apply comparative fault principles in intentional nuisance
cases-cases in which self-help was not involved. The confused and
antisocial results reached by these two groups of courts highlight the
need for a reasoned understanding of the proper role of comparative
fault in intentional torts.
1. Battery
a. The Early Cases
At common law, the defenses to intentional torts were in theory
absolute. If the defendant could establish one of the recognized privi-
leges,1" the plaintiff was barred from recovery.1 ' At the same time,
if the plaintiff could establish an intentional tort, his faulty conduct
was in theory irrelevant to his recovery.
Some early courts, uncomfortable with such rigid rules, began
to consider plaintiffs' faulty conduct in regard to damages awards.
Thus, although it has been almost universally held that a plaintiff's
conduct can never justify an intentional tort committed against
him, " ' these courts considered such conduct in mitigation of dam-
ages."' Similarly, although most states that allowed punitive dam-
ages also allowed consideration of a plaintiff's conduct to preclude or
reduce those damages,1"' apparently to disprove malice, 3 . states split
on the question of reducing a plaintiff's compensatory or actual dam-
ages because of his faulty conduct.13
117. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, ch. 4.
118. Id. § 16, at 99.
119. Id. § 19, at 110; Note, 41 TEX. L. REV. 124, 125 (1962). See Grau v. Forge, 183
Ky. 521, 209 S.W. 369 (1919); Elliot v. Brown, 2 Wend. 497 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829); Unruh v.
Murray, 84 N.W.2d 730 (N. Dak. 1957); Thorne v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 167 Pa. Super. 572, 76 A.2d 485 (1950). The minority view originated in L.ouisiana.
Although words alone no longer justify an assault in that state, Morneau v. American Oil Co.,
272 So. 2d 313, 315-16 (La. 1973) (reversing earlier cases; see Note, 34 LA. L. REV. 137
(1973)), provocative conduct by the plaintiff still bars his recovery. Tripoli v. Gurry, 253 La.
473, 475, 218 So. 2d 563, 565 (La. 1969) (upholding "aggressor doctrine"); see also Freeman
v. Logan, 475 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Ky. 1972); Coleman v. Moore, 426 So. 2d 652, 653 (La. Ct.
App. 1982); Graves v. Irwin, 396 So. 2d 384, 386 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Matthews v. Sno's
Seafood & Steak House, Inc., 356 So. 2d 527, 529 (La. Ct. App. 1977); 6 AM. JUR. 2D
Assault and Battery § 151 (1963 & Supp. 1983). But see Note, 14 FORDHAM L. REV. 95, 98
(1945) (discrediting the rule).
120. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 19, at 110.
121. Id.; see also Note, 14 FORDHAM L. REV. 95, 96-97 (1945).
122. Note, supra note 121, at 96-97 nn.14-15.
123. Annot., 63 A.L.R. 890 (1929) (and supplementing cases). See Goldsmith's Adm'r
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Jurisdictions that did allow reduction of compensatory damages
based their decisions on an "inverse punitive damages""1 ' theory.
Speaking for the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Morely v. Dunbar,2"
Chief Justice Dixon explained why the plaintiff's actual damages in
a suit for assault and battery were reduced:
[PIrovocation ...though not sufficient to entirely justify the
act done, may constitute an excuse which will mitigate the ac-
tual damages; and, where the provocation is great ... may re-
duce them to a sum which is merely nominal. This seems to
follow as the necessary and logical result of the rule which per-
mits exemplary damages to be recovered. Where motive consti-
tutes a basis for increasing the damages of the plaintiff above
those actually sustained, there it should, under proper circum-
stances, constitute the basis for reducing them below the same
standard. If malice in the defendant is to be punished by the
imposition of additional damages, or smart money, then malice
on the part of the plaintiff, by which he provoked the injury
complained of, should be subject to like punishment, which, in
his case, can only be inflicted by withholding the damages to
which he would otherwise be entitled.126
Although not expressly doing so, these courts were applying compar-
ative fault to self-help intentional torts."' 7 This is clearest in an early
Connecticut case in which there had been a battery following several
hours of provocation. The court observed that "the jury were bound
to consider the whole transaction . . . .They must ascertain how
far the plaintiff was in fault, if in fault at all, and how far the defen-
v. Joy, 61 Vt. 488, 490-92, 17 A. 1010, 1012-14 (1889) (excellent discussion of the opposing
views).
124. "[M]itigation of damages is only punitive damages in another form." Note, 16
HARv. L. REv. 591, 591 (1902). Accord, Note, 41 TEX. L. REV. 124, 127 (1962). Sedgwick
articulated the theory in 1I. T. SEDxWlC, MEASURE OF DAMAGES (7th ed. 1880):
Where there is a reasonable excuse for the defendant, arising from the provoca-
tion or fault of the plaintiff, but not sufficient entirely to justify the act done, the
circumstances of mitigation must be applied to the actual damages. If it were
not so, the plaintiff would get full compensation for damages occasioned by him-
self. The rule ought to be, and is practically, mutual. Malice and provocation in
the defendant are punished by inflicting damages exceeding the measure of com-
pensation, and in the plaintiff by giving him less than that measure.
Id. at 521 n.b.
125. 24 Wis. 183 (1869).
126. Id. at 187; see also id. citations at 188. Morely was subsequently modified against
the vehement dissent of Chief Justice Dixon in Wilson v. Young, 31 Wis. 574 (1872). See
infra note 130.
127. That courts did not openly recognize this is understandable because comparative
fault was neither widely used nor well thought of even in negligence cases. See supra note 19.
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dant, and give damages accordingly. ' '128
Although many courts allowed reduction of compensatory dam-
ages, 129 an equal number did not,180 fearing that to do so would
"virtually . ..allow provocation as a [complete] defense. '" '1 Today
the majority of states still deny reduction of compensatory dam-
ages,1"" but a growing minority of states allow such reduction.13'
b. The Modern Cases
In Comer v. Gregory,'" the Supreme Court of Mississippi up-
128. Burke v. Melvin, 45 Conn. 243, 246 (1877).
129. E.g., Keiser v. Smith, 71 Ala. 481 (1882); Ireland v. Elliott, 5 Iowa 78 (1858);
Avery v. Ray, 1 Mass. 11 (1804); Kiff v. Youmans, 86 N.Y. 324, 330-31 (1881); Robison v.
Rupert, 23 Pa. 523, 525 (1854); Goldsmith's Adm'r v. Joy, 17 A. 1010, 1012-13 (Ver. 1889);
Note, 16 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1902); Annot., 63 A.L.R. 890, 894-96 (1929). See also Linford
v. Lake, 3 Hurl. & N. 276, 157 Eng. Rep. 475 (1858); Perkins v. Vaughan, 5 Scott, N.R. 881,
134 Eng. Rep. 405 (1842); Fraser v. Berkeley, 7 Car. & P. 621, 173 Eng. Rep. 272 (1836).
130. E.g., Mitchell v. Gambill, 140 Ala. 316, 320, 37 So. 290, 291 (1904); Prentiss v.
Shaw, 56 Me. 427, 436-38 (1869); Baltimore Transit Co. v. Faulkner, 179 Md. 598, 20 A.2d
485 (1941); Goldsmith's Adm'r v. Joy, 17 A. 1010, 1013-14 (Ver. 1889); Crotteau v. Karl-
gaard, 48 Wis. 2d 245, 250, 179 N.W.2d 797, 800 (1970); Corcovan v. Harran, 55 Wis. 120,
12 N.W. 468 (1882); Fenelon v. Butts, 53 Wis. 344, 351, 10 N.W. 501, 503 (1881). In Wil-
son v. Young, 31 Wis. 574 (1872), the court sought a middle ground, allowing reduction of a
plaintiff's "personal" damages but not his "actual" damages. But see Chief Justice Dixon's
vehement dissent contesting this distinction, id. at 585-92. A similar distinction was attempted
in Ulrich v. Schwarz, 199 Wis. 24, 225 N.W. 195 (1929). See Note, 14 FORDHAM L. REV. 95,
97 nn.16 & 23 (1945).
131. Donnelly v. Harris, 41 111. 126, 128 (1866).
132. E.g., Mangus v. Miller, 35 Colo. App. 335, 535 P.2d 219 (1975); Haumont v.
Alexander, 190 Neb. 637, 211 N.W.2d 119 (1973); Tevis v. Tevis, 155 N.J. Super. 273, 280,
382 A.2d 697, 701 (1978); Fordyce v. Montgomery, 424 S.W.2d 746, 751 nn.4 & 5 (Mo.
1968); Beville v. Mac K. Falls, Inc. 49 Or. App. 477, 481-82, 619 P.2d 958, 960 (1980);
Taylor v. Gentry, 494 S.W.2d 243, 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). These holdings are analagous
to the rule that the doctrine of mitigation of damages applies only to nonintentional conduct.
See Meadolake Foods Inc. v. Estes, 218 S.W. 2d 862, 868 (Tex Civ. App. 1948); Smith v.
International Printing P. & A. Union, 190 S.W.2d 769, 775 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). But see
Loker v. Damon, 17 Pick. 284, 288 (Mass. 1835); Galveston Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry.
v. Zantzinger, 92 Tex. 365, 371, 48 S.W. 563, 566 (1898).
133. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 19, at 110, states that there is "little authority"
supporting the minority view, and cites only four states that allow reduction of actual damages.
Id. at 110 n.31. Presently, reduction of actual damages is the rule in at least three states, see
infra notes 134-47 and accompanying text; cases allowing such reduction can be found in six
additional states, see infra notes 148-53. Moreover, four states appear to hedge on the issue.
Glenn v. Chenowth, 71 Ariz. 271, 226 P.2d 165 (1951) (suggesting plaintiff's compensatory
damages will be reduced if provocation is shown); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Ellington, 92
Ga. App. 24, 27, 87 S.E.2d 665, 667 (1955) (provocation may mitigate damages for assault
and battery) (dictum); Baltimore & 0. Ry. v. Barger, 80 Md. 23, 32-33, 30 A. 560, 562
(1894) (issue of reduction due to provocation not properly before the court); Ellsworth v. Wat-
kins, 101 N.H. 51, 132 A.2d 136 (1957) (leaving issue open).
134. 365 So. 2d 1212 (Miss. 1978). See Twyner, A Survey and Analysis of Comparative
Fault in Mississippi, 52 Miss. L. J. 563, 582-84 (1983) (asserting that extension of compara-
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held compensatory damages of only $125, although the plaintiff had
proved damages of over $9,000. The defendant in Comer battered an
intoxicated plaintiff while he was trespassing at midnight on the de-
fendant's catfish pond; when the plaintiff motioned to his pocket, the
defendant shot him. The court noted that under a Mississippi stat-
ute, "the jury was entitled to consider all of these mitigating circum-
stances and to reduce damages accordingly." '85 With candor rarely
seen in intentional tort cases, the court observed that "[m]itigating
circumstances are closely akin to contributory negligence,"130 and
reasoned that "since all questions of negligence are for the jury to
decide,"1 " it was proper for the jury to consider the plaintiff's con-
tributory fault, even though a battery was alleged. 38
In Morneau v. American Oil Co.,1189 the Supreme Court of
Louisiana held that words alone never justify an assault, but instead
constitute evidence tending to reduce a plaintiff's recovery.1 40 In sub-
sequent cases Louisiana courts have found sufficient provocation to
merit reduction of compensatory damages for battery. In Foster v.
Barker,141 the plaintiff went to the defendant's apartment at mid-
night and discovered the plaintiff's girlfriend and the defendant in
matching blue pajamas. The plaintiff threatened the defendant, who
responded by shooting the plaintiff. Because of the plaintiff's con-
duct, the trial judge slashed his compensatory award by $9,000.143
tive fault of intentional torts is consistent with the concept of "pure" comparative fault). Re-
duction of actual damages has long been allowed in Mississippi. See Blanton v. Tri-State
Transit Co. of La., Inc., 194 Miss. 393, 398, 12 So. 2d 429, 431 (1943) ("in actions for assault
and battery, defendant may show any extenuating circumstances in mitigation of damages").
135. Comer, 365 So. 2d at 1214, citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-61 (1972): "Mitigat-
ing circumstances. In actions for libel or slander, assault and battery, and false imprisonment,
the defendant, under the plea of not guilty, may give in evidence any mitigating circumstances
to reduce the damages, notwithstanding he may also have pleaded a justification."
136. 365 So. 2d at 1214.
137. Id. (citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-17 (1972)).
138. Id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals appears also to adopt this approach.
Shugar v. Guill, 51 N.C. App. 466, 479, 277 S.E.2d 126, 135, modified on other grounds, 304
N.C. 332, 283 S.E.2d 507 (1981) (although provocation is no defense to assault, it can be
considered in mitigation of plaintiff's damages). See also Lewis v. Fountain, 168 N.C. 277, 84
S.E. 278 (1915); Frazier v. Glascow, 24 N.C. App. 641, 643, 211 S.E.2d 852, 853 (1975).
139. 272 So. 2d 313 (La. 1973). See Note, 34 LA. L. REV. 137 (1973).
140. Morneau, 272 So. 2d at 315-316.
141. 306 So. 2d 910 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
142. The court reasoned:
[W]e note that the plaintiff in this suit incurred past medical expenses totaling
$1,476.06. Future medical expense of $50.00 is proven. There is testimony to
the effect that he lost approximately ten weeks wages, which according to the
plaintiff was to the extent of approximately $150.00 per week, plus commis-
sions. We also note that the gunshot wounds, the pain and suffering resulting
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The appellate court, noting that the plaintiff "went looking for
trouble, and he found it," sustained the trial judge's reduction.148
The Louisiana Court of Appeal has upheld reduction of com-
pensatory damages in similar cases: the court has sanctioned reduc-
tion of a plaintiff's extensive compensatory damages for battery, be-
cause of his provocative acts;14' affirmed an award of only $250 for
pain and suffering, although a plaintiff had spent three weeks in the
hospital following a battery;"" and most recently, reduced by more
than $2,500 a plaintiff's compensatory damage award for battery be-
cause he had repeatedly chastised the defendant, an "already angry
tugboat captain," with "one of the most offensive epithets. 1 46
The rule allowing reduction of compensatory damages is also
followed in North Carolina.14  In six additional states-Tennes-
see,' 48 Texas,' Pennsylvania, ° Iowa,' New York,' and Massa-
from those gunshot wounds, and the additional future hospital medical [ex-
penses] which will be necessary for the removal of the bullet, would also consti-
tute damages for which this Court would normally award the sum of five or six
thousand dollars. Future hospital expenses were not, however, proven. While an
award for these other items would normally be in order, we believe that theprovocation, the verbal abuse and the action of the plaintiff in this case certainly
should be held against him in mitigation of the damages. For those reasons we
refuse to award the loss of wages in this case and we're going to cut the award
for personal injuries down to the sum of $2,500.00.
Id. at 913.
143. Id.
144. Watts v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 309 So. 2d 402 (La. Ct. App. 1975). Plain-
tiff, 55, was given reduced compensatory damages of only $27,000 for his "pain, suffering,
permanent brain damage, permanent change of personality, permanent loss of sexual potency,
temporary worsening of his heart condition, loss of one month's pay, and loss of past and
future earnings as a used car salesman." Id. at 406-08.
145. Johnson v. Powell, 338 So. 2d 177 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (barroom fight between
two women).
146. Posey v. Fabre, 369 So. 2d 237, 240 (La. Ct. App. 1979). Reaching the same
conclusions, see, e.g., DiBenedetto v. Stark, 428 So. 2d 864, 866 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Downey
v. Clark, 426 So. 2d 331, 334 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Choate v. Greene, 386 So. 2d 948, 950(La. Ct. App. 1980); Norrell v. City of Monroe, 375 So. 2d 159, 162 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
147. See supra note 138.
148. Jenkins v. Hawkins, 98 Tenn. 545, 41 S.W. 1028 (1897) (allowing reduction of
"actual" damages to one cent in wrongful death suit); Arnold v. Wiley, 39 Tenn. App. 391,
284 S.W.2d 296 (1955) (allowing reduction of actual damages below cost of medical bills).
149. Mohler v. Owens, 352 S.W.2d 855, 858-59 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (verbal provoca-
tion may be shown to mitigate actual and exemplary damages); see Note, 41 TEx. L. REV. 124
(1962).
150. Mawhinney v. Holtzhauer, 168 Pa. Super. 283, 287, 77 A.2d 734 (1951) ("Malice
and provocation in the defendant are punished by inflicting damages exceeding the measure of
compensation, and in the plaintiff by giving him less than that measure.") (affirming the rule
of Robison v. Rupert, 23 Pa. 523, 525 (1854)).
151. Bascom v. Hoffman, 199 Iowa 941, 945-46, 203 N.W. 273, 275 (1925) (approvingjury instruction allowing reduction of actual damages because of plaintiff's provocation).
152. Kiff v. Youmans, 86 N.Y. 324, 330 (1881) (although plaintiff's provocation cannotjustify assault and battery, it may mitigate his compensatory damages) (dictum); Genung v.
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chusetts'5"-cases allowing reduction of compensatory damages in
self-help cases can be found, although they are less recent and seem
not to be followed today.
2. Nuisance
Most nuisance cases are based on intentional conduct.1" Ac-
cording to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, intentional nuisance
consists simply of continuing existing unreasonable conduct with
knowledge that it annoys the plaintiff. 5
Courts recently have begun to employ comparative fault ap-
proaches to intentional nuisance cases. This trend has taken two
forms: based on economic and social considerations, equity courts
have fashioned novel remedies for intentional nuisance problems; 56
Baldwin, 77 A.D. 584, 586-87, 79 N.Y.S. 569, 570 (1902) (mitigation of compensatory dam-
ages approved to reduce recovery for battery) (following dictum in Kiff, supra); Note, 14
FORDHAM L. REV. 95, 97 n.20 (1945). See also Decker v. Werbenec, 36 Misc. 2d 220, 221-
22, 232 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262-63 (1962) (assault and battery; following dictum in Kiff, supra);
Winant v. State, 33 Misc. 2d 990, 991, 227 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108 (1962) (abusive language of
plaintiff considered in mitigation of damages); Brown v. State, 24 Misc. 2d 358, 365, 205
N.Y.S.2d 73, 80 (1960) (provocative words may be considered in mitigation of damages for
battery).
153. Conroy v. Fall River Herald News Co., 306 Mass. 488, 491, 28 N.E.2d 729, 731
(1940) (when plaintiff state senator provoked defendant newspaper to defame him, court prop-
erly instructed jury to consider plaintiff's conduct in mitigation of damages); Jackson v. Old
Colony St. Ry., 206 Mass. 477, 487, 92 N.E. 725, 728 (1910).
154. Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VIR. L. REV.
1299, 1317 (1977); 40 A.L.R.3d 611 § 3 (1971).
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 825, comment (d) (1977): "when the con-
duct is continued after the actor knows that the invasion is resulting from it, further invasions
are intentional." See also W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 8, § 87, at 574 n.32.
156. Although the traditional equitable remedy for nuisance is injunction, courts have
imposed that solution only after "balancing the conveniences" of the parties. Note, Balancing
the Equities, 18 TEx. L. REV. 412 (1940); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 611, 616 (1971). Although
courts in the past have often refused to engage in balancing in cases in which the defendant
acted intentionally (see, e.g., Mobile & 0. Ry. v. Zimmern, 206 Ala. 37, 89 So. 475, 16
A.L.R. 1352 (1921); Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P.2d 702 (1942); Stuart v. Lake
Washington, 141 W. Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d 891 (1956)), courts have recently engaged in balanc-
ing even in intentional nuisance cases, and have sought imaginative solutions to intentional
nuisance problems. See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del Webb Dev., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700, 53
A.L.R.3d 861 (1971) (plaintiff himself at fault must indemnify defendant liable for intentional
nuisance in order to acquire desired injunction).
Commentators on nuisance law have been even less respectful of common law rules re-
garding defendants' intentional conduct. Some economic theorists seem almost to ignore the
concept of fault; they propose that the free market should be allowed to determine resolution of
nuisance cases. See generally Calabrese & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960); Rabin, supra note 154.
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and of immediate concern to the present inquiry, courts of law have
attempted to apply comparative principles to intentional nuisance.
The following actions for damages illustrate the struggle of these
courts.
In Sandifer Motors, Inc. v. City of Roeland Park,"' the defen-
dants maintained a dump that periodically overflowed into the plain-
tiff's drainage ravine. The city knew that it was causing continuing
problems for the plaintiff.'58 Finally, after a heavy rain, the plain-
tiff's drainage outlet clogged and overflowed into his warehouse. He
sued for intentional nuisance to recover the resulting damages. At
trial the defendant proved that the plaintiff had negligently con-
structed and maintained the outlet. The jury apportioned fault thirty
percent to the plaintiff, fifty percent to the defendant, and twenty
percent to unknown third persons, and awarded damages accord-
ingly. Although the Kansas Court of Appeals agreed that the parties'
conduct merited their sharing liability, the court unfortunately was
less than forthright in reaching this result. After stating that compar-
ative fault applied only in nuisance actions grounded in negli-
gence,"' it then strained to characterize the defendant's obviously
intentional conduct as negligence in order to allow comparison.'60
157. 6 Kan. App. 2d 308, 628 P.2d 239 (1981).
158. The plaintiff had previously sued the city over similar occurrences. Id. at 318-19,
628 P.2d at 248. The first suit was settled (and the plaintiff executed a covenant not to sue on
those original events) prior the the action in question, and the parties consented to a motion in
limine to prevent introduction of evidence relating to those events. At trial the city attempted to
claim it did not know of the plaintiff's continuing problem with the dump. The trial court
allowed the plaintiff to produce evidence (not protected by the motion) that the city mayor
actually knew a lawsuit had been filed and settled. The court of appeal upheld introduction of
this evidence. Id. at 319-20, 628 P.2d at 248-49. Thus, there was proof the city knew that its
continued conduct created a nuisance.
159. Id. at 317-18, 628 P.2d at 247-48.
160. The court accepted the definition of intent given in the Restatement:
An invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land or an inter-
ference with the public right, is intentional if the actor
(a) acts for the purpose of causing it, or
(b) knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result from his
conduct.
Id. at 318-19, 628 P.2d at 248 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 825, at 117
(1965)).
Although the facts of the case showed that the defendant city knew it was interfering with
the plaintiff's land, the court maintained that the city's action was not intentional:
This case involves a specific incident stemming from a condition apparently
existing for a number of years prior to the injury. There had been some isolated
instances of trouble in prior years-even, as will be discussed later, to the point
of provoking a lawsuit. However, there was apparently nothing of the magni-
tude of this incident, and no evidence was introduced of any trouble before
1975. The jury heard only of heavy rains earlier in 1975 which had caused
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In Melendres v. Soales,161 the Michigan Court of Appeal faced
the same dilemma but declined to take the Sandifer "recharacteriza-
tion" approach. The court recognized that the defendant, who "felt it
unnecessary" to post warning signs in shallow recreational lake
water into which patrons often dove, had thereby created an inten-
tional nuisance." The plaintiff negligently dove into the murky
shallow waters and suffered severe injuries. The court held that the
plaintiff's conduct could not be compared with that of the defendant,
because the defendant acted intentionally. Wincing at this result, the
court suggested that fairness required comparison in such cases, but
deferred instead to mechanical application of precedent, and allowed
the plaintiff full recovery. 68
In Furrer v. Talent Irrigation Dist.,'" the plaintiff sued to re-
cover damages for the death of over 165 pear trees. The defendant
plaintiff concern, but no serious difficulties. Although the city may have known
of the plaintiffs continuing concern, it was not until plaintiff's drainage system
clogged and ruptured, presumably as a result of the combination of trash and
debris washing down the ravine and the improper design of the system itself,
that serious damage occurred. The fact that the city contributed by its dumping
is not sufficient to charge it with intentional wrongdoing. Along with other un-
named parties, the city simply dumped where it should not have. There is noth-
ing to indicate it intended to damage the plaintiff, or that the injury was sub-
stantially certain to occur. At best, the evidence showed only that the city's
conduct created a condition posing an undue risk of harm. Accordingly, it was
proper for the jury as fact finder to allocate causal responsibility for plaintiff's
damages.
Id. (emphasis added and deleted). But the court missed the point. The facts showed the defen-
dant city knew that a nuisance would result from its conduct. See supra note 158. Nothing
more need be shown to establish intentional nuisance.
Still, the Sandifer court is on the right track. It recognized that the conduct of the parties
should be compared, even though according to accepted definitions, the defendant acted inten-
tionally. The court was understandably reluctant to allow the plaintiff, who was also at fault,
to recover fully. But it is unfortunate that a court need engage in dishonest and contorted
factual and legal analysis in order to achieve socially desirable results. Instead, the court might
have openly and candidly acknowledged the extension of comparative fault principles to non-
self-help intentional nuisance actions.
161. 105 Mich. App. 73, 306 N.W.2d 399 (1981).
162. Id. at 81, 306 N.W.2d at 403. The court noted that this conclusion was mandated
under the Michigan Supreme Court's definition of intentional nuisance as enunciated in
Gerzeski v. Department of State Highways, 403 Mich. 149, 161-62, 268 N.W.2d 525, 529
(1978).
163. In this case, we reach a result which we believe is mandated by Supreme
Court precedent. At the same time, on the facts of this case, we think it inequi-
table that if the jury on retrial finds an intentionally created nuisance . . . as
that term is defined [by the state supreme court], that defendants cannot inter-
pose as a defense, possibly reducing their liability, plaintiff's negligent conduct.
105 Mich. App. 73, 84, 306 N.W.2d 399, 404-05.
164. 258 Or. 494, 466 P.2d 605 (1970).
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irrigation district had opened a small canal next to the plaintiff's
orchard. The plaintiff noticed that the water table on his property
grew higher after the canal was opened and he was aware that a
high water table would, in time, drown the feeder roots of his trees
and permanently injure them. Still, in the ensuing years, he in-
creased the irrigation of his property. The Supreme Court of Oregon
found that the defendant irrigation district knew or had reason to
know its water was seeping into the plaintiff's land. The court con-
cluded that an intentional nuisance or trespass had occurred. Noting
that contributory negligence (which was at the time applicable) did
not apply in intentional tort actions, the court nevertheless applied
the rule of "avoidable consequences" to uphold jury instructions al-
lowing reduction of the plaintiff's recovery.165 It seems, however,
that in its haste to reach an equitable solution that accounted for the
plaintiff's conduct, the Oregon court reached an appropriate result
by questionable means. The "avoidable consequences" concept is an
exception to contributory negligence; the doctrine seeks to isolate sep-
arate causation and apportion damages accordingly. Although ap-
pealing on a theoretical level, in practice it is often impossible to
apportion causes unless the circumstances allow a logical division to
be made between component events. 1" It seems highly unlikely that
the Furrer court could state whether it was the water applied by the
plaintiff or the water allowed to seep by the defendant that killed a
given tree. Instead it seems that the court applied a comparative fault
test to the intentional nuisance and awarded to the plaintiff that per-
centage of the total damages allocable to the defendant's fault. Ex-
tension of comparative fault to intentional nuisance torts would clar-
ify and legitimize this result by obviating the need for courts to
engage in questionable legal craftmanship in order to accomplish in-
directly that which could be directly attained through explicit appli-
cation of comparative fault.
Clearly, courts have struggled to apply comparative fault princi-
ples to intentional torts. Unfortunately, some courts have employed
comparative fault in cases characterized by self-help, and others have
165. Id. at 512-16, 466 P.2d at 614-16.
166. W. PRossER, supra note 19, § 67, at 423 n.68. The court's approach also ignores
the fundamental difference between comparative fault and comparative causation. See supra
note 95. The Oregon court followed Furrer in Reter v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 258 Or. 140,
482 P.2d 170 (1971).
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declined to expressly apply comparative fault in intentional nuisance
cases not characterized by self-help. In doing so, the battery cases
have reached antisocial results, in that they seem to sanction self-
help; and the nuisance cases, by mechanical adherence to precedent,
have stretched to reach equitable results through strained legal
reasoning.
V. IMPLEMENTING COMPARATIVE FAULT PRINCIPLES IN
APPROPRIATE INTENTIONAL NUISANCE TORTS
As shown above, there exist substantial social policy reasons as
well as a solid theoretical foundation in favor of applying compara-
tive fault to appropriate intentional nuisance actions not reflecting
self-help. Policy goals to be furthered by extension of comparative
principles include consistent analysis of tort actions, and equitable
allocation of loss among all parties whose faulty conduct has proxi-
mately caused damages. On the other hand, policy considerations of
deterrence and punishment of the defendant, which militate against
extension of comparative principles to self-help intentional torts, are
of questionable relevance to intentional nuisance situations, which by
their nature typically do not reflect the same degree of social oppro-
brium that attaches to self-help conduct. In any event, deterrence
and punishment of intentional nuisance tortfeasors would still be
available through imposition of punitive damages.
We have also seen that comparative fault can be applied to non-
self-help intentional torts consistently with the continuum theory of
fault presented earlier. Although courts in extending comparative
principles to strict tort liability actions have gone so far as to allow
comparison of conduct truly dissimilar (fault compared with no-
fault), we do not need to venture so far in order to extend compara-
tive principles to appropriate intentional tort cases. As discussed
above, fault can be viewed as a continuum of conduct ranging from
objective negligence to subjective intent. Some courts have by impli-
cation already rejected the notion that a fictional "difference in kind"
precludes comparison of the three traditional classifications of con-
duct. These courts have allowed comparison of plaintiffs' negligent
conduct and defendants' reckless conduct. In regard to theoretical
consistency the logical next step is to recognize that intentional as
well as reckless conduct is subject to comparative fault analysis.
A. Application of Comparative Fault Statutes
Several states have adopted comparative negligence by statute.
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In current form many of these comparative negligence laws would
accommodate application of comparative fault principles to inten-
tional nuisance situations. Maine's statute, for example, calls for
comparison and reduction of damages "[wihere any person suffers
death or damage as a result partly of his own fault and partly of the
fault of any other person or persons." ' The statute continues,
"[flault means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or
omission which gives rise to a liability in tort."1" Arkansas' statute
contains a similarly broad definition of fault: "[tjhe word 'fault' as
used in this Act . . . includes any act, omission, conduct, risk as-
sumed, breach of warranty or breach of legal duty which is a proxi-
mate cause of any damages by any party." '  The statutes of Louisi-
ana,170 New York,"' Oregon,1 7 California,1 7 3 Puerto Rico, 17  and
Rhode Island 175 are also broad enough to allow comparison in ap-
propriate intentional torts. Even jurisdictions that by decision or by
statute appear to apply contributory fault only to negligence cases
would have little difficulty allowing comparison in appropriate in-
tentional torts, considering the ease with which those jurisdictions
have extended comparison to strict tort liability actions."" The
167. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 156 (1980) (plaintiff may recover only if he is less
at fault than defendant).
168. Id.
169. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979). Like the Maine statute, Arkansas
allows recovery only when plaintiff is less at fault than defendant.
170. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1983) (allowing comparison when
damage is the result "partly of [plaintiff's] own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of
another person or persons").
171. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976) (allowing comparison of the "cul-
pable conduct" of plaintiff and defendant).
172. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1979) (plaintiff may recover if his "fault" is less than
the "fault" of defendant). The statute includes a caveat: "[tihis section is not intended to create
or abolish any defense."
173. When California judicially adopted comparative negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), the court relied on a century-
old statute liberal enough to embrace intentional torts:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also
for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully
or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 17 14(a) (West Supp. 1984).
174. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31 § 5141 (1968) (calling for reduction of damages for "fault
or negligence").
175. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1982) (plaintiff's recovery is diminished in pro-
portion to his negligence; statute fails to mention defendant).
176. Alaska, in Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975) and California, in Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), adopted compara-
tive fault specifically in negligence cases. In Li, the court took pains to revise an earlier draft of
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courts have traditionally been activist in the area of torts;1  evolu-
tion in the past decades of products liability law and comparative
negligence law indicate that a willing court would be fully capable
and competent to fashion appropriate rules governing comparative
fault in non-self-help intentional torts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The admiralty courts first articulated the notion that a party's
intentional conduct barred apportionment or division of damages.
The reason for the rule was simple and pragmatic; the courts sought
merely to prevent parties from abusing the old rule of division of
loss, which guaranteed each ship owner half damages after a
collision.
The early common law courts, apparently uncomfortable with
the idea of allowing juries to determine relative fault, rejected the
idea of apportioning damages, and instead employed contributory
negligence to bar from recovery, plaintiffs who were at fault. These
courts, however, found it necessary to develop numerous ameliorative
fictions to mitigate the harsh effect of the contributory negligence
bar. Chief among these was the rule that a plaintiff's negligent con-
duct would not bar his recovery in intentional tort. Given that the
alternative was to bar completely a plaintiffs recovery, this made
sense. But now that contributory negligence does not apply in the
the opinion that called for apportionment of damages based on percentage of "causal responsi-
bility." The final draft speaks of apportioning damages' based on "fault," defined as "negli-
gence in the accepted legal sense." Id. at 816 n.6a, 532 P.2d at 1232 n.6a, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
864 n.6a. See Schwartz, supra note 24 at 756. But such seemingly restrictive language has
stopped neither the California nor the Alaska Supreme Courts from extending comparative
fault principles to strict liability actions. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575
P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (products liability); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593
P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Butaund v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42,
46 (Alaska 1976) (products liability). Florida, which adopted comparative fault in negligence
cases in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 78 A.L.R.3d 321 (Fla. 1973), extended compara-
tive principles to strict liability actions in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla.
1976).
Other states have also extended comparison to strict liability, though their respective com-
parative fault statutes seem to confine comparison to negligence cases. E.g., Busch v. Busch
Const., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977) (statute later amended to include strict liability
actions, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 604.01-.04 (West Supp. 1983) (implicitly excluding intentional
conduct in definition of fault)). In a case applying Mississippi law, a federal court of appeals
invoked comparative fault in strict liability. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276,
290 (5th Cir. 1976) (interpreting Miss CODE ANN. § 11-7-17 (1972) (statute appears merely
to abrogate contributory negligence)). See also Toyota Motor Co. v. Sanford, 375 So. 2d 1036,
1038 (Miss. 1979) (approving Edwards in dictum).
177. See Bischoff, The Dynamics of Tort Law: Court or Legislature?, 4 VER. L. REv. 35
passim (1979).
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majority of jurisdictions, further adherence to the practice of ignoring
a plaintiff's conduct when an intentional tort is alleged cannot con-
tinue to be justified as an avoidance of the contributory negligence
bar. Instead, the justification must rest, if at all, either on the theory
that legal symmetry forbids comparison of conduct thought to be dif-
ferent in kind, or on the basis that application of comparative fault
in intentional torts would violate social policy.
This article has asserted that intentional, reckless and negligent
conduct are not different in kind, but merely reflect different degrees
of violation of a common social norm. Surely, policy considerations
militate against creating the appearance of sanctioning or facilitating
self-help by intentional tortfeasors by allowing them to employ com-
parative fault principles to reduce a plaintiff's recovery. Courts that
recently have applied comparative fault to intentional battery cases
seem to violate social policy in this regard. But the policy considera-
tions against sanctioning self-help are less applicable to cases of in-
tentional nuisance, which reflect not self-help, but mere willingness
to allow existing norm-violating conditions to continue. Indeed, the
policy of achieving full consideration of all parties' liability in pro-
portion to their fault militates in favor of extending comparative
principles to appropriate intentional nuisance cases.
To effect this same policy, courts have begun to extend compar-
ative fault to recklessness and strict liability actions. Other courts
have recently struggled with intentional nuisance cases in order to
produce equitable results within the framework of existing prece-
dent. Although the results reached in the latter group of cases may
sometimes seem proper, these opinions contribute only confusion to
an area of the law in which court decisions reflect most clearly the
conflict between legal fiction and just results.
Courts should openly recognize that the asserted "different in
kind" theory poses no theoretical obstacle to comparison of inten-
tional, reckless, and negligent conduct. The cases over the past cen-
tury and a half suggest that the real test for application of compara-
tive fault in intentional torts should be one of social policy not
fictional theoretical symmetry. With recent exception in some south-
ern states, courts deciding intentional tort cases have declined both to
apply the contributory negligence bar, or to invoke comparative
fault, in order to avoid sanctioning self-help measures by defendants.
Although that policy consideration counsels against application of
comparative fault in true self-help intentional torts, the same consid-
eration may often be absent in other intentional tort actions, such as
nuisance. In those cases courts should reevaluate precedents inconsis-
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tent with the real policy considerations behind the application of
comparative fault to intentional torts.
